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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Governance, Capital Market Discipline and the Returns on Investment* 
by Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu 
We analyze the impact of corporate governance institutions, ownership structures and 
external capital market constraints on company returns on investment by using a sample 
of more than 19,000 companies from 61 countries across the world. We show that (1) of 
these three sets of institutions, the origin of a country’s legal system proves to be the 
most important. Companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earn returns 
on investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital. (2) Differences in 
investment performance related to a country’s legal system dominate differences related 
to ownership structure. (3) Strong external capital markets improve the investment 
performance of companies. 
 
Keywords: Return on Investment, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, Capital Market 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, L21 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Corporate Governance, Kapitalmarktdisziplinierung und die Renditen von 
Unternehmensinvestitionen 
Dieses Papier analysiert den Einfluß von Corporate Governance Institutionen, 
Eigentümerstrukturen und externen Kapitalmärkten auf die Renditen von Investitionen 
für ein Sample von mehr als 19.000 Unternehmen aus 61 Ländern weltweit. Wir zeigen, 
dass von diesen drei Institutionen (1) die Herkunft des Rechtssystems eines Landes der 
wichtigste Faktor ist. Unternehmen in Ländern mit Rechtssystemen englischer Herkunft 
verdienen Renditen, die die Kapitalkosten im Durchschnitt abdecken. (2) Unterschiede 
im Rechtssystem eines Landes dominieren Unterschiede in der Eigentümerstruktur. (3) 
Funktionierende externe Kapitalmärkte verbessern die Performance von Investitionen. 
 
                                                 
*  The research in this article was supported in part by the Austrian National Bank’s Jubiläumsfonds, Project 
8090.  The article has benefited from comments of Lars-Hendrik Röller, Ajit Singh, Andy Cosh, Alan 
Hughes, Paul Guest and seminar participants at the CBR, University of Cambridge and WZB, Berlin. 
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Like all good theories, the neoclassical theory of investment, as first formulated say by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), derives strong and refutable predictions from an elegant and simple 
model. Assuming that managers maximize the wealth of their shareholders, they invest until the 
point where their cost of capital equals the marginal returns on investment. Since the cost of 
capital is the same for internally and externally raised funds, investment levels are independent of 
how they are financed, and for the same reason, the returns on investment are predicted to be the 
same for all companies, abstracting from differences in corporate risk. 
A large empirical literature contradicts each of these predictions. Investment appears to be 
related to the source of finance suggesting the existence of a hierarchy of finance.1  Funds raised 
from outside of a firm to finance investment cost more than internal cash flows. Estimates of 
returns on corporate investment vary widely and are often substantially below company costs of 
capital.2 A variety of hypotheses have been put forward to explain these empirical findings 
including the existence of differential transaction costs in using the external capital market to 
finance investment (Duesenberry, 1958), asymmetric information, which raises the costs of using 
external capital markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984), and agency 
problems that allow managers to select investment levels that do not maximize shareholder wealth 
(Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964, 1998; Grabowski and Mueller, 1972). 
Much of the theoretical work on investment has consciously or implicitly assumed the 
existence of an “Anglo-Saxon” institutional environment. Companies are isolated legal entities, 
which contract with other independent legal entities or individuals when they raise capital 
externally. Thus arises the possibility that the managers inside of a firm have different information 
about the returns on investment projects from the information available to potential suppliers of 
finance outside the firm. Common share ownership is assumed to be widely dispersed, resulting in 
deficient monitoring of managers and agency problems. Most of the empirical work that has 
tested these hypotheses about investment has also used datasets drawn from Anglo-Saxon 
countries like Canada, the UK and the USA. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) were among the first to demonstrate the importance 
of the institutional environment to these hypotheses. They showed that the kind of asymmetric 
information problems that can produce a relationship between cash flows and investment in 
Anglo-Saxon countries do not exist for Japanese companies belonging to groups, which generally 
include both other companies and a group bank. A group firm’s “external sources of finance” 
have access to the same information as its managers do, and thus external capital carries no 
premium with it, and internal cash flows lose their power to explain levels of investment. 
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In the last decade several additional studies have appeared that confirm the importance of 
institutional factors in explaining corporate investment with data from non Anglo-Saxon 
countries. One set of studies has stressed the importance of institutional factors in explaining why 
and when cash flows are significant determinants of capital investment and R&D.3 A second line 
of research examines how cross-national differences in capital market and corporate governance 
institutional structures are related to measures of performance like productivity and economic 
growth.4 
Our work also emphasizes the importance of institutional factors in determining a country’s 
economic performance, but differs from this other research in that we use a measure of 
performance that is directly tied to the micro-theory of the firm – the ratio of a firm’s returns on 
investment to its costs of capital. We focus upon three sets of institutions: (1) the corporate 
governance structure of a country as defined by its legal system, e.g., rules governing takeovers, 
the composition and election of boards of directors, etc. (2) the ownership structure of a company, 
and (3) the strength of a country’s external capital market. The first two sets of institutions 
determine how closely a manager's goals are aligned with those of the owners of a firm, and thus 
the extent to which a firm’s investment performance may suffer from agency problems. The third 
set of institutions determines the extent to which a firm’s investment performance is constrained 
by the capital market regardless of how closely managers’ and owners’ interests coincide. Our 
paper presents evidence that all three sets of institutions can affect the investment performance of 
companies in a given country. 
We proceed as follows: The main hypotheses tested are developed in the following section. 
Section II describes the methodology employed to measure returns on investment and test the 
different hypotheses. The data used in these tests are discussed in section III. The results 
regarding the effects of corporate governance and ownership structures are presented in section 
IV, and regarding external capital markets in section V. Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
I. Main Hypotheses 
A. Legal Institutions and Returns on Investment 
A firm that maximizes shareholder wealth invests up until the point where the marginal 
return on investment equals its cost of capital. In our empirical work we measure what effectively 
amounts to a marginal Tobin’s q , mq , where m r iq =  and r  is the average rate of return on a 
firm’s investment, and i  is its cost of capital.  Since the average return of investment should be 
equal to or greater than the marginal return, we predict for a firm, which maximizes shareholder 
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wealth, 1mq ≥ . 
We shall define a strong corporate governance system as one, which aligns managerial and 
shareholder interests and thus leads managers to maximize shareholder wealth. Managerial and 
shareholder interests are more likely to be aligned in countries in which it is easy for shareholders 
to monitor managers, and initiate proxy fights or hostile takeovers if they are displeased with their 
company’s performance. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, hereafter 
LLSV) have recently categorized the legal environments of countries according to the protections 
of this sort that they give to shareholders. We shall employ their categorization as a measure of 
the strength of a country’s corporate governance system, and use it to test: 
Hypothesis 1:  For companies located in countries with strong corporate governance systems, 
1mq ≥ .
5
 
Weak corporate governance systems allow managers to pursue their own goals at the 
shareholders’ expense. Recent research has focused on the conflict between managers and 
shareholders over dividend payments (LLSV, 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2000). Where corporate governance systems are weak managers pay out less in dividends and 
retain larger fractions of their cash flows to pursue their own goals. Among these may be the 
pursuit of size and growth as emphasized in the earlier managerial discretion literature.6 The flip 
side of paying out too little dividends is investing too much. This reasoning leads us to expect 
1mq < , in countries with weak corporate governance systems. 
Some firms have attractive investment opportunities and limited financial resources, 
however, and both their managers and their shareholders benefit from their achieving high 
investment rates and rapid growth. For these companies no conflict between managers and 
shareholders over dividend and investment policies exists. Indeed, these companies are often 
young firms in rapidly growing industries – the kinds of companies that can suffer from 
asymmetric information problems – and thus are likely to under invest, so that 1mq ≥ . This 
consideration leads us to qualify our prediction for weak corporate governance systems. 
Hypothesis 2: For companies with limited investment opportunities that are located in countries 
with weak corporate governance systems, 1mq < . 
 
 
 4
B. Legal Institutions, Ownership Structures and Returns on Investment 
Of necessity a manager’s interests are aligned with those of a shareholder, if the shareholder 
and manager are one and the same person. Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of a 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is for there to be a separation of 
ownership from control, and all early contributions to the managerial-discretion literature cited 
Berle and Means (1932) to this effect. This literature implicitly assumed that when ownership was 
concentrated, either the managers themselves or an outside family held the controlling stake in the 
firm. In either case it was assumed that the owners wished to have the managers maximize their 
wealth, and thus that manifestations of managerial discretion, like low returns on investment, 
would be observed only when share ownership was widely dispersed. This hypothesis will be 
tested by comparing the mean qm for companies with widely dispersed ownership with the mean 
for other companies in countries with strong corporate governance structures. 
Hypothesis 3: In countries with strong corporate governance systems, companies with widely 
dispersed shareholdings have lower qms than the other companies in their country group. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1911, 1934, p. 94) was perhaps the first economist to postulate that 
managers are empire builders. Schumpeter did not put forth this assumption to explain the actions 
of Berle/Means managers who own small fractions of shares, however, but as a description of the 
goals of the owner-entrepreneurs who founded the giant enterprises that appeared in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, individuals whom he likened to “medieval knights” seeking to found 
“dynasties.” The intrinsic rewards from running a giant enterprise may appeal to professional and 
owner managers alike. Moreover, the persons typically classified as owner managers do not own 
all of the company’s outstanding shares. Thus, a manager/shareholder conflict still is possible 
with respect to the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, in countries where takeovers 
and proxy contests are relatively easy to initiate, a manager’s immunity to such attacks increases 
with her shareholdings. Thus, a priori it would seem that managers’ incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth might increase or decline with their shareholdings. Consistent with this 
ambiguity, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have observed for the U.S. that Tobin’s q first 
rises, then falls and finally rises again as managers’ shareholdings increase. These considerations 
lead us to conclude that no simple predictions about the values for qm for companies controlled by 
individuals or families can be made for countries with strong institutional protections of minority 
shareholders. 
In countries with weak protections the situation is somewhat different. First of all, in these 
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countries we do not expect to observe as many companies with dispersed share ownership as in 
countries with strong protections of minority shareholders. Investors will be unwilling to bid large 
sums for shares when they know that they can be exploited by the dominant shareholders, and the 
owner-founders will therefore not issue many shares.7 When one observes a company with widely 
dispersed ownership in a country whose legal institutions do not protect minority shareholders, 
one must assume that the company had sufficiently attractive investment opportunities, or the 
original dominant owners were somehow able to bond themselves to not exploit minority 
shareholders, so that they were able to issue many shares. These firms can be expected to earn 
relatively high returns on investment, and thus we obtain: 
Hypothesis 4: In countries with weak corporate governance systems, companies with widely 
dispersed shareholdings have higher qms than the other companies in their country group. 
Although the existing literature leads to the prediction that individually-controlled 
companies have higher returns on investment than other companies in countries with strong 
corporate governance systems, no similar prediction can be made for individually-controlled 
companies in countries with weak corporate governance systems. All companies in our sample 
have issued common shares, which are traded on organized securities markets. The individual or 
family who controls a company, which we have categorized as individually-controlled, owns the 
largest block of the company’s shares, but not all of them. Any funds distributed to all 
shareholders must thus be shared with other shareholders. Thus if it is possible, the individual or 
family who controls a company may try to appropriate company funds in ways that do not add 
value to the company’s shares. Weak corporate governance systems provide greater scope for the 
exploitation of minority shareholders by the dominant shareholder, and make it impossible to 
predict whether individually-controlled companies in countries with weak corporate governance 
systems will exhibit superior investment performance.8 
Similar difficulties arise in trying to hypothesize about the relative performance of 
companies falling into the remaining three ownership categories that we identified: firm-
controlled, finance-controlled and state-controlled, where by finance-controlled we mean 
controlled by a bank, insurance company or some other financial institution. For example, it is 
reasonable to expect that those in control of any firm A, even if they are empire builders, will want 
the managers of any firm B that A controls to maximize its profits, as this provides more funds for 
A to pursue the goals of those who control it, whatever they may be. Thus, we might expect higher 
returns on investment for firms that are controlled by other companies. 
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On the other hand, there are several reasons why companies lower down in a pyramid may 
exhibit poor investment performance: (1) the families standing behind these pyramids are empire 
builders who are willing to sacrifice profits at all levels of the pyramid in pursuit of their goals, 
(2) the pyramid’s size makes careful monitoring of lower-level firms difficult, and (3) the 
performance of lower level firms is sacrificed to benefit the parent firm at the top of the pyramid.9 
Given these conflicting possibilities, we do not think that it is possible to make specific 
predictions regarding the investment performance of companies controlled by other companies. 
We shall, however, test to see whether this category of ownership is associated with systematic 
differences in investment performance. We examine the effects of cross-ownership and corporate 
pyramids separately. 
Predicting the effects of financial control on investment performance is equally difficult. 
Banks and other financial institutions are also susceptible to agency problems between their 
managers and ultimate owners. Merger activity in the banking sector of the United States and 
Europe in recent years suggests that some bank managers may also find empire-building to be an 
attractive pursuit. A bank’s managers may condone and even finance the aggressive expansion 
programs of firms that it controls so long as they can pay the interest on debt owed to the bank, 
since the bank’s growth rate is positively linked to that of these firms. Thus, companies controlled 
by financial institutions might not perform any better than other companies. Germany’s strong 
economic performance during the first quarter century following World War II has often been 
attributed to wise advice and careful monitoring of the private sector provided by its major banks 
and other financial institutions. Many observers now think that the role of banks in Germany has 
been exaggerated, however.10  Some observers even blame major banks in Asia for making the 
“crisis” of the late 1990s worse than it would have been11. We shall test for any systematic effects 
of control by financial institutions on company investment performance, but make no predictions 
as to what this effect should be. 
A double principal-agent problem can be said to exist, in the case of state-controlled firms. 
Their ultimate owners are the citizens of the state. The same free-rider logic that makes 
shareholders poor monitors of managers when shares are widely dispersed, makes citizens poor 
monitors of politicians. Thus, citizens are unlikely to hold politicians accountable for the poor 
investment performance of a state-owned company, and elected politicians may not exert great 
effort monitoring these companies in the citizens’ interests leading to poor investment 
performance. On the other hand, state-controlled firms are often located in key economic sectors 
and possess dominant market positions. These favorable circumstances might create sufficiently 
attractive investment opportunities for state-controlled companies to offset the inefficiencies 
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caused by agency problems. We again leave it to the data to sort out these conflicting tendencies. 
C. Capital Market Discipline and Returns on Investment 
Consider Figure 1. Investment outlays are given along the horizontal axis, and marginal 
returns on investment ( mrr ) and the cost of capital, i, along the vertical axis. If the costs of 
external and internal capital are the same, a firm with marginal returns on investment of Hmrr  
and internal cash flows CF, maximizes shareholder wealth by investing IH  and raising (IH - CF) 
on the external capital market. Its mrr i= , and its average return on investment, r, will be greater 
than i making 1m r iq = > . 
If the costs of external capital are greater than for internal capital because of the transaction 
costs of issuing bonds and equity, or because of asymmetric information problems between 
managers and the capital market, the shareholder-wealth-maximizing firm invests less than IH  and 
mrr i> , and mq  rises still further above one. Thus for firms that maximize shareholder wealth, 
their returns on total investment should be greater than their costs of capital, and this relationship 
should hold regardless of the source of investment funds. We shall use subscripts to designate 
sources of investment funds: 
,m Iq  = the ratio of r to i for total investment, 
,m CFq = the ratio of r to i for investment out of cash flow, 
,m Dq  = the ratio of r to i for investment out of new debt, and 
,m Eq  = the ratio of r to i for investment out of new equity. 
We then have 
Hypothesis 5: For companies with , 1m Iq ≥ , it is also true that , 1m CFq ≥ , , 1m Dq ≥ , and , 1m Eq ≥ . 
Now consider a firm with the marginal returns on investment schedule Lmrr . It maximizes 
shareholder wealth by investing IL and paying ( )LCF I−  in dividends. If its managers wish to 
grow faster than the rate implied by this investment, they of course invest more than LI . As I 
increases, mrr  falls below i.  If the firm were to invest all of its cash flow, its return on 
investment would be k , which could also be regarded as the implicit cost of internal capital. 
Should it wish to invest still more, it would have to enter the external capital market. Even if it 
only had to pay i for externally raised funds, these funds would cost considerably more than its 
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implicit cost of internal capital.  Thus, for firms whose managers pursue growth, there is 
effectively a discontinuity in their cost of capital schedule at the point where they enter the 
external capital market, even if there are no transaction costs or information asymmetries to raise 
the cost of external capital above i. Thus, the prediction arises that growth-maximizing managers 
favor internal cash flows to finance their investments. 
The prediction presumes, of course, that the firm must pay at least i when it enters the 
external capital market. When this is the case, we shall say that there exists strong capital market 
discipline. We state this definition as a hypothesis 
Hypothesis 6: In countries with strong capital market discipline, for companies with , 1m Iq < , it is 
also true that , 1m CFq < , but , 1m Dq ≥ , and , 1m Eq ≥ . 
Our definition of a country with weak capital market discipline is simply one in which firms 
do not have to pay the full cost of externally raised capital. Soft loans are available from friendly 
banks, and some investors are willing to buy new debt and equity issues at prices that exceed the 
risk-adjusted present values of the interest and dividend streams that can be expected from the 
companies making these issues. Thus, we obtain 
Hypothesis 7: In countries with weak capital market discipline, for companies with , 1m Iq < , 
, 1m CFq < , and either , 1m Dq < , or , 1m Eq < , or both. 
Since a bank loan or debt issue constitutes a more specific commitment and carries with it 
ostensibly greater penalties from breaking this commitment, we expect in general that 
, ,m D m Eq q> , whenever one or both are 1< . This leads to 
Hypothesis 8: In countries with weak capital market discipline, for companies with , 1m Iq < , 
, ,m D m CFq q>  and , ,m D m Eq q> . 
Thus, in countries with weak capital market discipline, we predict a hierarchy in the returns 
on investment that differs from that usually assumed to hold for the costs of capital. The weakness 
of the implicit contract between managers and equity holders compared to the contractual 
relationship between debt holders and managers produces higher returns for investments out of 
new debt issues than for those made out of new equity issues and cash flows. 
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II.  Methodology12 
Let It be a firm's investment in period t, CFt+j the cash flow this investment generates in 
t j+ , and it the firm's discount rate in t.  
 ( )1 1
t j
t j
j
t
C
PV
i
∞
+
=
=
+
∑  (1) 
We can then take the market’s estimate of PVt and the investment It  that created it, and calculate a 
pseudo-permanent return rt on It 
 t t tt mt
t
I r qPV I
i
= =  (2) 
If the firm had invested the same amount It in a project that produced a permanent return 
rt, this project would have yielded the exact some present value as the one actually undertaken.  
The ratio of rt to it, which we call qmt, is the key statistic in our analysis.  If a firm maximizes 
shareholder wealth, then it undertakes no investment for which 1m tq < .  That qmt is a marginal q 
can be easily seen from (2) by contrasting it with Tobin’s q.  Tobin’s q  is the market value of the 
firm divided by its capital stock and is thus an average return. Marginal q is the change in the 
market value of a firm divided by the change in its capital stock (investment) that caused it. 
The market value of the firm at the end of period t can be defined as 
 1 1 tt t t t tM M PV Mδ µ− −= + − +  (3) 
where tδ  is the depreciation rate for the firm's total capital as evaluated by the capital market, and 
tµ  is the market's error in evaluating Mt.  The assumption of capital market efficiency implies 
that the error term in (3) has an expected value of zero, and thus that equation (3) can be used to 
estimate both δ and qmt under the assumption that tδ  and qmt are either constant across firms or 
over time, or both. Replacing PVt in (3) with m tIq , and rearranging yields 
 1
1 1 1
t t t t
m
t t t
M M Iq
M M M
µδ−
− − −
−
= − + +  (4) 
Equation (4) is favored over other possible rearrangements of (3), because it does not 
involve a lagged dependent variable, and in cross-section regressions is less likely to be subject to 
heteroscedasticity owing to the deflation of all error terms by 1tM − 13. Equations (3) and (4) 
incorporate the assumption that the market value of a firm at the end of year 1t −  is the present 
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discounted value of the expected profit stream from the assets in place at 1t − . Changes in market 
value are due to changes in assets in place as a result of investment and depreciation. The 
estimated qms are then essentially marginal Tobin's qs defined on all investments made in t. 
The intuition behind (4) is straightforward.  Abstracting from depreciation, when a firm 
invests $100 at a return equal to its cost of capital, its market value rises by $100.  If its market 
value rises by more than $100, r i> .  The depreciation factor, tδ , measures the fall in the market 
value of the firm that would take place in year t, if it made no investments. It captures not only the 
decline in the value of a firm’s capital equipment due to wear and tear, technological obsolescence 
and the like, but also the decline in the value of the firm’s intangible &R D  and advertising 
stocks due to imitation by competitor or the expiration of patents. Since the importance of 
technological change, &R D , advertising, and the like, varies across industries, we shall estimate 
separate depreciation rates for each industry. General differences in corporate environments, like 
the intensity of competition, degree of state regulation, etc., will affect a company's profits and 
thus its market value. These differences are not likely to vary from year to year, however, and thus 
should not affect changes in market values nor our estimates of δ .14 
To estimate (4) we need data on the market value of each firm and its investments. A firm’s 
market value at the end of year Mt, is defined as the market value of its outstanding shares at the 
end of t plus the value of its outstanding debt. Since this number reflects the market's evaluation 
of the firm's total assets, we wish to use an equally comprehensive measure of investment. 
Accordingly we define investment as 
&I After tax profits Depreciation Dividends D E R D ADV= + − + ∆ + ∆ + + . 
D∆  and E∆  are funds raised using new debt and equity issues. Since &R D  and advertising 
expenditures ( ADV ) are also forms of investment that can produce “intangible capital” which 
contributes to a company’s market value, we add them to investment to obtain a measure of the 
firm's additions to its total capital. 
 
II. The Data 
The financial data are taken from the 1996-2001 versions of the Global Vantage and 1997 
version of the Compustat databases of Standard & Poor's. These data sets contain accounting and 
stock price data on companies with listed stocks from virtually every country in the world starting 
in 1985. We exclude banks and financial companies and some service industries (SICs 6000 
through 6999 and above 8100), because the nature of capital and investment in these industries is 
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not comparable to those of non-financial firms. To minimize the weight of outliers, we cap our 
basic variables at both the 1st and 99th percentiles of each country sample. After this procedure we 
are left with 19,010 companies. In many countries and for many companies data were not 
available for all 16 years. Table 1 reports the number of firms, time period coverage and total 
number of observations for each of the 46 countries, which we group according to the LLSV 
classification, and for China, nine transition countries and five African countries. It also reports 
the means, standard deviations and medians of the main variables used in our analysis. Appendix 
A details the construction of the variables. 
Our ownership data come mainly from three sources: AMADEUS database for the European 
companies, Compact Disclosure for the US, and the Asian (Japanese) Company Handbook for 
Asian companies (Japan). The remaining data sources on ownership structure are listed in 
Appendix B. 
 
IV. Tests of Hypotheses Regarding Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures 
A. The Effects of Country Legal Systems 
We first employ eq. 4 to test for significant differences in investment performance across 
countries that are related to the origins of their legal systems (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The intercept 
in eq. 4 is an estimate of the depreciation rate; the expected fall in a company's market value in 
any given year, if it makes no investments. Depreciation rates vary across companies depending 
on the kinds of capital they invest in. To allow for these differences, we assign each company to a 
two-digit SIC industry, and estimate a separate depreciation rate (intercept) for each industry. 
Our model assumes that the stock market makes an unbiased estimate of the true value of a 
firm’s total assets at the end of t-1, and all changes in the firm’s market value during year t are 
therefore due to either its investment during this year or the depreciation in the value of its total 
assets. Stock markets are notoriously volatile, however,15 and it is thus possible that annual 
changes in company market values are affected by general shifts in market sentiment that change 
the market’s estimation of the value of assets in place. To correct for these swings in sentiment we 
use yearly deviations from country sample means for each variable in the regression. 
Table 2 presents the results from this estimation using all available data for each country for 
the period 1985 through 2000. In Panel A estimates of depreciation rates are presented for 24 
industries, along with estimates of qm for six country groups. There are a total of 112,590 
observations, and the model explains about 25 percent of the variations in company market 
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values. Turning first to the estimates of depreciation, we see that 16 of the 24 estimates have the 
predicted negative sign, and all but one of these falls in the plausible interval between zero and ten 
percent, the exception being the chemicals industry with pharmaceuticals removed (SIC 28), 
which had an estimated 15.5 percent depreciation rate per annum. Most of the negative 
depreciation rates (positive intercepts) are close to zero, but in the pharmaceuticals (SIC 283) and 
communications industries there appears to have been a sustained upward drift in prices over the 
last 15 years of the 20th century. 
LLSV (1997) argue that countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems have the strongest 
corporate governance systems followed in order by the Scandinavian, German and French origin 
countries. Countries with French origin legal systems are claimed to have the weakest corporate 
governance systems. Our estimates of returns on investment as a fraction of costs of capital, our 
ˆmq s, match this prediction. Countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems have a ˆmq of 1.02, the 
highest value of any country group. The average firm in every other country group earned a return 
on investment significantly less than its cost of capital. Among the country groups classified by 
LLSV, the best performer was the Scandinavian group of countries with a ˆmq  of 0.78, followed 
by the Germanic group ( ˆmq  = 0.74). Consistent with LLSV’s arguments, the average firm in a 
French-origin country had a return on investment of only 59 percent of its cost of capital. 
We also report ˆmq s for pooled groups of transition and African countries. The estimated 
returns on investment are 64 percent of company costs of capital for the transition countries. This 
low figure is consistent with the general impression that corporate governance structures in 
transition countries do not afford shareholders much protection against the managers of their 
firms, but also suggests that corporate governance structures in transition countries are no weaker 
and arguably marginally stronger than in French-origin countries. 
Most students of development would also probably not expect that corporate governance 
structures are particularly strong in Africa. The ˆmq  of 0.77 for the African countries, roughly the 
same as for the Scandinavian countries, is somewhat surprising, therefore. Since most of the 
African countries in our sample are former British colonies, this result might be interpreted as 
indicating that the remnants of British legal institutions left from colonization offer shareholders 
some protection even in an otherwise unfriendly environment for capitalist firms. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we present separate estimates of mq  for individual countries grouped 
once again according to the LLSV categorization. We omit the coefficients on the industry 
dummies in this and all subsequent sets of results to save space. Their magnitudes and 
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significance are always comparable to that reported in Panel A.  Roughly the same picture 
emerges when we observe the ˆmq s for the individual countries, as was seen for the entire groups. 
The countries with the strongest corporate governance systems– English-origin and the 
Scandinavian countries – have the lowest fractions of ˆmq s significantly less than 1.0 (8/16 and 2/ 
4).16  In contrast five of the six ˆmq  for the German-origin, and 14 of 20 for the French-origin 
countries are significantly less than 1.0. 
The effects of the “Asian crisis” can also be seen, when the results in Panel B are compared 
to earlier estimates of mq  by Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000). Using data up through 1996, they 
estimated ˆmq s > 1.0 for Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Japan, while these countries all pick 
up ˆmq s < 1.0 in our data. A split between the three Asian countries in the German-origin group 
and the three European ones was observed in the Mueller/Yurtoglu study and can still be seen in 
our results, despite the Asian crisis. Taiwan’s ˆmq  is significantly greater than 1.0, and Japan’s is 
much higher than either Switzerland’s or Germany’s ˆmq . 
Other than this division within the German-origin group, we have not been able to discern 
any obvious geographic pattern to our estimates of investment performance besides that related to 
country legal systems. Many of the countries with low ˆmq s are in Europe, but the differences in 
ˆmq s in Panel B of Table 2 cannot be explained by a simple Europe/non-Europe dichotomy. 
Within Europe the only three countries with ˆmq s insignificantly different from 1.0 (Ireland, 
Norway and Finland) are in the two LLSV categories with the strongest corporate governance 
systems. Great Britain has the fourth highest ˆmq  of the European countries. The nine lowest ˆmq s 
for Europe belong to countries in the two lowest LLSV categories (Germany, Switzerland, 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey). 
Differences in investment opportunities may also explain why some of the ˆmq s in countries 
with weak corporate governance systems (e.g., Chile and Taiwan) are both greater than 1.0 and 
much higher than for other countries in these groups. It is perhaps worth pointing out that 
differences in investment opportunities cannot explain estimates of mq  that are significantly less 
than 1.0 in members of the Anglo-Saxon group like Great Britain and New Zealand. If companies 
in these countries have poor investment opportunities, which is of course quite possible, this 
should lead to low levels of investment, if managers are maximizing shareholder wealth. Poor 
investment performance ( ˆ 1mq < ) can only come about, if managers invest more than the amount 
that would maximize shareholder wealth. 
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At the bottom of Panel B we present the ˆmq  for China. It is 0.45. Corporate governance 
institutions in Communist China do not appear to do a very good job aligning manager and 
shareholder interests. 
 
B. The Effects of Ownership Structures 
In Section I we put forward several hypotheses that related investment performance to the 
ownership structure of a firm. These hypotheses are tested by using eq. 4, and allowing mq  to take 
on different values depending on both a company’s country of origin and its ownership structure. 
Whenever the largest shareholder owns 10% or more of a company’s equity, the company is 
categorized as owned by this person or institution.  Given the differences observed in Table 2 
between the ˆmq s for the three European countries with Germanic-legal-systems and the three 
Asian countries in this group, we have divided the German-origin countries into European and 
Asian subgroups. 
Table 3 presents our results from this exercise. Twenty-four separate depreciation rates were 
again estimated, but are not reported. Under each origin heading there are two entries. The first 
entry for each ownership category represents the point estimate of ˆmq  for that category. Thus, 
family controlled firms in English-origin countries have a ˆmq  of 1.082, which is significantly 
greater than 1.00 as indicated by the p-value of a two-tailed test below this coefficient. The second 
entry is the ˆmq  for the remaining companies in that country group. Thus, the ˆmq  for all English-
origin companies that were not family controlled is 1.019. The > separating these two numbers 
indicates that the first entry is greater than the second, and the number below the inequality is the 
level of significance of this difference. Entries in boldface indicate differences significant at the 5 
percent level, two-tailed test. 
The first thing that stands out in Table 3 is that all ˆmq s > 1.0 for the English-origin 
countries, as opposed to only three for the remaining 40 entries in the table. The origin of a 
country’s legal system overwhelms differences in ownership structures in explaining returns on 
investment. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that companies with dispersed ownership should have lower mq s than 
other companies in countries with strong corporate governance systems. The ˆmq  for dispersed-
ownership companies is less than for the remaining firms in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot accept Hypothesis 3. We note again, 
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however, that mq  is an estimate of a company’s average return on investment relative to its cost 
of capital, since the estimate is made using data on total investment in each year. Shareholder 
wealth maximization requires equating the marginal returns on investment to the cost of capital. 
Thus, the estimate of mq  of 1.001 for dispersed-ownership firms in Anglo-Saxon countries likely 
implies a marginal return on investment somewhat under their costs of capital, suggesting some 
agency problems for these companies. 
The significantly higher ˆmq  for the companies controlled by individuals (families) might 
also be interpreted as indirect evidence of agency problems when ownership is dispersed. An 
alternative interpretation would be that family-controlled companies have trouble raising capital 
externally due to asymmetric information problems. This interpretation might also explain the 
significantly smaller ˆmq  for companies controlled by financial institutions. These companies 
presumably do not have trouble raising external capital to finance worthy investment projects. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that companies with dispersed ownership have higher returns on 
investment than other firms in countries with weak corporate governance systems, since the 
owners were able to issue many shares in the first place by credibly committing themselves not to 
exploit small shareholders.  This hypothesis finds support in both the Scandinavian and Germanic-
European countries. In both cases the estimated qm  is above 1.0 and significantly higher than for 
the other companies in these two country groups. Given that only one other entry in Table 3 for a 
non-English-origin country is greater than one, these results provide rather strong support for 
Hypothesis 4 in these countries. Companies with dispersed ownership in Scandinavia and 
Germanic-Europe are mostly large, multinational firms, and it would appear that they are subject 
to the same corporate governance constraints as companies in the Anglo-Saxon countries.17 In the 
three Asian countries with German-origin legal systems and the French-origin countries, no 
significant differences in the ˆmq s for dispersed-ownership companies and the rest of the samples 
were observed, however. 
Neither a priori reasoning nor the existing empirical evidence allowed us to make 
predictions about the relative performance of companies that are individually-controlled in 
countries with weak corporate governance systems, or are finance-controlled, or non-financial-
controlled or state-controlled. Consistent with these ambiguities, we generally find no significant 
difference between the ˆmq  for companies in one of these ownership categories and that for all 
other firms in its country group. The only significant difference in investment performance for 
individually-controlled companies to be observed in Table 3 is for the English-origin countries as 
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predicted by Hypothesis 3. 
The ˆmq  for companies controlled by financial firms is significantly less than that for other 
firms in the English-origin group. This ˆmq  is greater than one, nevertheless, and also greater than 
that for each of the other four country groups. It is thus not possible to say that financially-
controlled firms in English-origin countries do badly in an absolute sense. The only other 
difference in ˆmq s that is statistically significant occurs for the French-legal-system sample, where 
the point estimate of 0.692 is significantly greater than that of 0.579 for the rest of the sample. 
Although financial institutions appear to improve the investment performance of companies that 
they control in French-legal-system countries, they do not bring about a spectacular improvement. 
Companies controlled by financial firms are still predicted to have returns on investment that are 
less than 70 percent of their costs of capital. Their performance looks good only in comparison to 
other companies in the French-legal-system countries. 
In none of the five country groups is there a significant difference between the ˆmq  for firms 
controlled by other, non-financial companies and that of the rest of the sample. Managers of one 
company are not significantly better at monitoring managers of other companies than are other 
ownership groups.18 As discussed above, this may be because the potential advantages managers 
have as monitors of other firms are dissipated through the construction of large pyramidal 
structures. Additional evidence on the performance of companies in corporate pyramids is 
presented in the following subsection. 
The estimate of ˆmq  for state-controlled companies in the three Germanic-European 
countries is 0.374, the smallest estimate in Table 3. Within these three countries, the agency 
problems associated with state-control of enterprises clearly seem to dominate. In three of the 
remaining four country groups the ˆmq  for state-controlled companies is larger than for other 
firms, with the ˆmq s for state-controlled companies in the three Asian countries with German-
origin systems and the countries with French-origin systems being both insignificantly different 
from 1.0. In these two country groups, state firms actually exhibit the best investment 
performance of any ownership category. One explanation for this superior performance might be 
that state-controlled companies in these countries are located in industries with particularly 
attractive investment opportunities. Another possible explanation, of course, is that the state in 
these countries is an adept monitor of the firms that it controls.19 
The results in Table 3 imply that ownership structures are less important determinants of 
investment performance than legal institutions. In the three Asian countries with German-origin 
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legal systems none of the ˆmq s for any ownership category is significantly different from that for 
the remaining firms. In the four other country groups, only seven of the 20 ˆmq s for particular 
ownership categories are significantly different from those for the remaining firms. The most 
consistent differences in ˆmq s visible in Table 3 are across country legal systems rather than across 
ownership categories. 
 
C. The Effects of Insider Ownership Concentration, Pyramiding, Cross-Shareholding and 
Voting Rights 
In this subsection we present some additional tests of the effects of ownership structure for 
countries where we have a richer data set on ownership structures. 
1. The Effects of Insider Ownership in the United States 
As noted in section I, when ownership is concentrated in the hands of managers, it can have 
two, opposing effects on a company’s investment performance. As a manager’s ownership stake 
rises, the manager may identify more closely with other shareholders, and thus try to increase the 
market value of the firm. Alternatively, a larger ownership stake reduces the threat of dismissal 
thus freeing a manager to pursue goals that conflict with the other shareholders’ interests. Thus, a 
priori rising ownership concentration in the hands of insider managers has an ambiguous impact 
on firm performance. 
We use data on the shareholdings of managers of U.S. corporations to test for the effects of 
inside ownership concentration on investment performance. We do this by interacting inside 
ownership variables with the investment term on the right-hand-side of eq. 4. The results are 
presented in Table 4. The number under qm is the coefficient on investment by itself, under IO is 
the coefficient on investment multiplied by the fraction of shares owned by insiders. IO2 
represents an interaction term with the square of IO, IO3 with its cube. The estimated coefficients 
imply a similar nonlinear relationship between qm and inside ownership concentration as Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) (hereafter MSV) observed for Tobin’s q. The predicted mq  rises from 
0.95 as inside ownership increases from zero reaching a peak of 1.21 at a shareholding of 22 
percent. From there mq  falls reaching a low of 0.92 at a shareholding of 68 percent, from there on 
it rises again. Thus, the entrenchment of management due to their possessing concentrated 
shareholdings results in a significant deterioration in their companies’ investment performance 
over the range of ownership concentration levels from 22 to 68 percent. The turning points 
observed by MSV were at 5 and 25 percent.20  Our sample is much larger than theirs, and contains 
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many smaller companies, which partly explains why the first turning point in our data comes at a 
much higher ownership concentration level. Managers of smaller firms must hold larger fractions 
of their companies’ shares before they feel safe enough in their jobs to pursue policies that destroy 
their shareholders’ wealth. When we restrict our sample to Fortune 500 firms as MSV did, the 
turning points in our data come at concentration levels of 11.6% and 40.3%. A second possible 
explanation for the difference in turning points is that our data are from the late 1980s and 1990s, 
while MSV’s are from 1980. The late 1980s merger wave with its many, highly visible hostile 
takeovers may have raised the levels of share ownership that managers perceive to be necessary to 
protect them from hostile takeovers. Our data also imply that the level of ownership concentration 
at which managers’ and shareholders’ interests become realigned is much higher than that 
suggested by MSV. 
2. The Effects of Pyramiding, Cross-Shareholding and Voting Rights in Europe 
Corporate pyramids in which company A owns a controlling interest in company B, B owns 
a controlling interest in C, and so on, are quite common in Western Europe. As noted in section I, 
companies in the lower levels of a pyramid can be expected to exhibit poor performance for 
several reasons: (1) the managers/families at the top of the pyramid are empire builders, (2) the 
managers at the top of the pyramid transfer resources from lower level companies up to the top, or 
(3) the distance between the top and a given company in the pyramid becomes too great for the 
managers at the top to monitor this company effectively. These considerations lead us to predict 
poorer investment performance for companies at lower levels in corporate pyramids. 
Corporate pyramids can lead to a diversion of a dominant owner’s interests and those of 
minority shareholders by allowing the dominant holder to lever the voting rights in her shares. 
When this occurs the dominant shareholder’s control rights exceed her cash flow rights, allowing 
her to exploit minority shareholders. We thus predict poorer investment performance for 
companies for which the dominant shareholder’s control and cash flow rights are unequal. 
Cross-shareholdings in which company A owns shares in companies B and C, B owns shares 
in A and C, and so on, are also frequently observed in Western Europe. Such interlocking 
shareholdings can entrench the managers of all of the companies so joined, and thus free them to 
pursue their personal goals at the expense of outside shareholders. 
To test these hypotheses three dummy variables were created: 1PYRM = , if a company is 
two or more levels down in a corporate pyramid, 0 otherwise; 1VR = , if the control and cash flow 
rights of the dominant shareholder are equal, 0 otherwise; and 1CROSS = , if a company is part of 
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a group of firms with cross-shareholdings, 0 otherwise. We again interact these three variables 
with the investment term on the right-hand-side of eq. 4, and include them along with investment 
in the equation. The results from this exercise are given in Table 5. All coefficients on the three 
interaction terms are statistically significant and of the predicted signs. They also imply 
economically significant impacts on investment performance due to differences in corporate 
governance structures. A company for which the control and cash flow rights of the dominant 
shareholder are equal, and it is not part of either a corporate pyramid or a group of companies 
linked by cross-shareholdings is predicted to have a return on its investment that is 80 percent of 
its cost of capital (0.68 + 0.12). In contrast, a company for which control rights exceed cash flow 
rights and is lower down in the pyramid and is linked to other companies by cross-shareholdings 
is predicted to have a return on its investment that is only 34 percent of its cost of capital (0.68 – 
0.09–0.25). 
3.The Effects of Cross-Shareholding in Japan 
Cross-shareholdings are also common in Japan, where members of the so-called keiretsu 
hold shares in each others’ companies. The same entrenchment of managers and negative effects 
on investment performance can be expected for members of these corporate groups. The first two 
entries in Table 6 report the ˆmq  for independent firms (0.94) and the difference in ˆmq  for group 
firms, both estimated over the entire sample period from 1985 through 2000. Members of 
corporate groups in Japan21 can be seen to have a predicted mq  that is 0.11 lower than that for 
independent firms (significant at 1 percent level). The effect of cross-shareholdings in Japan is not 
as large as for European companies, but it goes in the same direction. Group firms in Japan have 
significantly lower returns on investment relative to their costs of capital than do independent 
companies. 
As in most Asian countries, Japanese companies were hit hard by the “Asian crisis.” Our 
sample also expands dramatically over the last few years of the sample period through the 
addition of a large number of independent companies. To gage the effects of these events, we 
reestimated the equation for the periods 1985-95 and 1996-2000, roughly before and after the 
crisis. Over the first period, the group firms can still be seen to perform significantly worse than 
the independent companies. Following the advent of the crisis both the independent and group 
firms exhibit much poorer investment performance, and the difference between independent and 
group firms disappears. Our results imply, however, that when economic conditions are normal, 
cross-holdings of shares among companies in Japan have a similar effect on returns on investment 
to that observed in Europe, if less deleterious. 
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V. Tests of Hypotheses Regarding the Effects of Capital Market Constraints on the Returns 
on Investments from Different Sources of Finance 
In this section we test for the effects of capital market constraints on the returns on 
investment from different sources of finance. We first conduct these tests using our country group 
categories as proxies for differences in external capital market constraints, and then examine the 
effects of some alternative measures of capital market discipline. 
A. The Effects of Country Legal Systems 
The differences in legal institutions that have been used to distinguish among corporate 
governance systems also have implications with respect to the returns on investment that one 
expects from different sources of finance. To the extent that strong corporate governance 
structures protect shareholders’ interests, we can expect the returns on investments out of cash 
flows and new equity issues to be positively related to the strength of a country’s corporate 
governance structure. This leads us to predict that the returns on investments out of cash flows 
and new equity issues correspond to those observed for total investment across the different 
country legal environments. Since the contractual protections associated with debt are more 
specific and easier to enforce, a weaker or nonexistent relationship between corporate governance 
systems and returns on investment out of new debt is expected. For the same reason, we also 
predict for companies with returns on total investment that are less than their costs of capital, that 
the returns on debt are the highest of the three sources of funds. 
These predictions are tested using eq. 4 by estimating separate coefficients on investment 
for each source of finance. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 7. Consider first the first 
four country categories.22 The first row in each country group gives the estimates for the full 
sample of companies. The returns on investments out of cash flows follow the LLSV rankings of 
corporate governance systems except that the Scandinavian countries are ahead of the Anglo-
Saxon countries. The lowest returns on reinvested cash flows occur for the French-legal-system 
countries as predicted. 
Companies in the Anglo-Saxon countries obtain the highest returns on investments out of 
new equity issues. The second highest returns are not earned by companies in the Scandinavian 
countries, however, but in Germanic legal systems. The average returns on new equity issues in 
both the Scandinavian- and French-legal-system countries are significantly less than one. 
Consistent with the prediction that debt is a more binding commitment on managers than equity, 
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the returns on investments financed by new debt issues are seen to nearly equal their costs of 
capital across all legal systems. 
One reason why the returns on reinvested cash flows and new equity issues reported in the 
first row of each country group do not correspond to differences in the strength of legal systems 
across the groups is that there may be important differences in investment opportunities across the 
groups. Companies that issue equity in some Germanic countries, like Japan and Taiwan, may 
have more attractive investment opportunities than companies in the Scandinavian countries. 
Accordingly the second and third sets of results in each group present estimates with the sample 
divided into companies for which ˆ 1mq ≥ , and for which ˆ 1mq < .
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Hypothesis 5 predicts that for companies with , 1m Iq ≥ , ,m CFq , ,m Dq  and ,m Eq  are also 1≥ . 
This hypothesis is supported in each of the four country groups. For companies with attractive 
investment opportunities, no conflict between managers and shareholders exists over investment 
policies, regardless of a country’s legal institutions. Indeed, the very high ˆmq  estimated for some 
sources of funds for companies with ,ˆ 1m Iq ≥ , suggests that these companies are cash/equity 
constrained, and that their shareholders would benefit from even greater amounts of investment. 
The same cannot be said for the companies with ,ˆ 1m Iq < . All 12 ˆmq s estimated on the 
different sources of funds are less than one for these companies. Thus, none of the four sets of 
legal institutions produces a strong external capital market as defined in Hypothesis 6 — ,m Dq  and 
, 1m Eq > , even when mq  and , 1m CFq < .  If we accept this interpretation of the results in Panel A, 
then all four sets of results support Hypothesis 7 — ( 1mq < ) ⇒  ( , , ,1, 1, 1m CF m D m Eq q q< < < ), in 
the presence of weak external capital markets. 
Hypothesis 8 asserts that ( 1mq < )⇒ ( , ,m D m CFq q>  and , ,m D m Eq q> ) when external capital markets 
are weak. This hypothesis is fully supported in all four country groups.  In the Anglo-Saxon and 
Germanic countries reinvested cash flows earn the lowest returns, while in the Scandinavian and 
French-origin countries it is new equity issues that have the lowest returns. The bottom three 
entries in Panel A of Table 7 present separate estimates of qm for the three sources of investment 
funds for our samples of transition and African countries and China. The weakness of the 
corporate governance systems in each category is again revealed by the very low returns on 
investments made out of cash flows.  Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, ,ˆ 1m Dq ≥  at the 5 percent 
level, in all three cases, and ,ˆ 1m Eq ≥  for both the transition and African countries. We suspect that 
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this finding is not due to the fact that these countries have strong domestic external capital 
markets, but rather that companies in transition and African countries that raise external capital do 
so abroad or from foreign investors trading in their countries, and thus are effectively subjected to 
stronger capital market discipline than one might expect. Capital market institutions in China, on 
the other hand, do not appear to offer much protection to purchasers of new equity issues. Our 
samples are so small and contain so few companies for which 1mq ≥ , that we have not undertaken 
any further analysis of these three country groups. 
 
B. The Effects of Accounting Standards 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 7 imply that none of the four major categories of 
different legal institutions generates sufficiently strong external capital markets to force even 
companies with poor overall investment performance to earn returns on new debt and equity 
issues equal to their costs of capital. In this and the following subsection we thus present further 
tests of our hypotheses relating to external capital market discipline using two alternative 
measures of the strength of this discipline. 
Shareholders should be able to protect themselves better against self-serving managers and 
to make better decisions regarding the purchase of new equity issues, the better the quality of 
accounting information at their disposal. The Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (Bavishi, 1993) has examined the accounting practices in a large sample of countries 
and ranked them according to the number of desirable pieces of information each country’s 
standards require to be published. The scale of this index for the countries in our study runs from 
a low of 36 for Portugal to a high of 83 for Sweden with a median of 64. We have classified any 
country with a score of 64 or more as having a strong set of accounting standards, with a score of 
63 or less as having weak accounting standards.24 Our expectation is that returns on cash flows 
and new equity are relatively higher in countries with strong accounting standards. It is possible, 
of course, that an improvement in equity’s performance comes to some extent at the expense of 
debt holders, and not simply from a reduction of managerial discretion and an improvement in 
investment performance. We shall also be interested, therefore, in seeing whether strong 
accounting systems are associated with lower returns on investment financed through new debt 
issues. 
Our estimates of the returns on investments out of the three sources of funds for the two 
categories of accounting standards are presented in Panel B of Table 7. The number under the 
coefficient estimates for the weak-accounting-standards countries is the p-value of a test against 
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one. The number under the coefficient estimates for the strong accounting standards countries is 
the p-value of a test that the sum of the coefficients of weak and strong accounting standard 
countries is equal to one, whereas a * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. 
The results for all four country groups are in line with our expectations. Eleven of the 
twelve ,ˆm CFq s for countries with strong accounting standards are larger than the ,ˆm CFq s for 
countries with weak standards, five of them significantly so. Eleven of the twelve ,ˆm Eq s for 
countries with strong accounting standards are larger than the ,ˆm Eq s for countries with weak 
standards, five significantly so. Thus, the existence of strong accounting standards appears to 
strengthen the hand of shareholders resulting in higher returns on both reinvested cash flows and 
new equity issues, and this holds more or less regardless of a country’s legal origin.25 There is also 
a suggestion that the improvement in performance for equity holders comes to a degree at the 
expense of debt holders. Nine of the twelve ,ˆm Dq s for countries with strong accounting standards 
are smaller than the ,ˆm Dq s for countries with weak standards, one of these differences is 
significant at the five percent level, two others at the 10 percent level. 
We conclude that the existence of strong accounting standards does improve the investment 
performance of companies as far as shareholders are concerned. At the same time it must be noted 
that strong accounting standards alone do not suffice to produce a strong external capital market 
for equity, as defined in Hypothesis 6. When , 1m Iq < , , 1m Eq <  in all four country groups, even for 
countries with strong accounting standards. 
 
C. The Effects of Creditors’ Rights 
Countries' legal institutions differ both with respect to the protections that they offer to 
equity holders, and the protections that they afford debt holders. In the previous subsection, we 
examined the impact of one legal institution that particularly impacts equity holders, in this 
subsection we examine the effects of legal protections for debt holders. 
LLSV (1998) have examined the rights of creditors in different countries and ranked them 
on a scale of one to four, with four representing the strongest rights. Using this index we have 
classified any country with a score of 3 or 4 as having strong creditor rights, with a score of 1 or 2 
as having weak creditor rights.26  We anticipate superior performance on investments made out of 
new debt issues in countries with strong creditor rights, and possibly poorer performance for 
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investments financed out of cash flows or new equity issues in these countries. 
Our tests of these predictions are presented in Panel C of Table 7, which should be 
interpreted analogously to Panel B.  The results are once again in line with our expectations. Nine 
of the twelve ,ˆm Dq s for countries with strong creditors’ rights are larger than the corresponding 
,ˆm Dq s for countries with weak creditors’ rights. The fact that only two of these nine differences 
are statistically significant can be attributed to the ,ˆm Dq s already being equal to or greater than one 
in several cases even in the countries with weak creditors’ rights. There is also evidence that 
improved protection for debt holders harms new equity holders. Eleven of the twelve ,ˆm Eq s for 
countries with strong creditors’ rights are smaller than the ,ˆm Eq s for weak rights, with six of these 
differences being statistically significant. No systematic differences related to creditors’ rights 
were observed in the patterns of returns on investments out of cash flows, however. 
We conclude that strong creditor rights do tend to benefit debt holders and harm purchasers 
of new equity in all four country groups. Moreover, in the Germanic and Scandinavian groups the 
condition for a strong external capital market is fulfilled with respect to new debt, 1mq < , but 
,m Dq  is insignificantly different from 1.0, when creditor rights are strong. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Our study holds differences in corporate governance institutions, ownership structures and 
external capital market constraints to be important in explaining differences in company returns 
on investment relative to their costs of capital, qm.  Of these three sets of institutions, the origins 
of a country’s legal system proved to be the most important.  The hypothesis that English-origin 
legal systems produce corporate governance systems that better protect shareholders against 
managers than other systems found support in our data.  The null hypothesis that returns on 
investment were at least as great as company costs of capital failed to be rejected for the English-
origin countries, but was rejected for every other country group.  The null hypothesis was rejected 
for more than half of the individual countries examined.  However, the rejection rate was much 
lower for the two strongest corporate governance systems (10 of 20 countries) than for the 
weakest systems (20 of 27 including China).  
In general, differences in investment performance related to country legal systems 
dominated differences related to ownership structure.  In each of the five ownership categories, 
companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earned returns on investment equal to or 
greater than their costs of capital.  The same can be said for only three of 20 estimates of 
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investment returns by ownership category in the four country groups with non-English-origin 
legal systems.  In the three Asian countries with German-origin legal systems no ownership 
category had a significantly better investment performance than for the other firms in these 
countries.  Within the countries with non-English-origin legal systems, neither control by a 
financial firm nor by another non-financial company sufficed to ensure that returns on investment 
equalled company costs of capital.  Nor did control by a family raise qm to 1.0 in the Scandinavian 
and Germanic-European countries and the French-origin countries.27  In contrast, within the 
English-origin countries the estimate of qm for family-controlled firms was both greater than 1.0 
and higher than for any other ownership category in this country group.  This result also illustrates 
the importance of a country’s corporate governance legal institutions in determining its 
investment performance. Strong corporate governance institutions help to align managerial and 
shareholder interests, and prevent dominant individual or family shareholders from exploiting 
minority shareholders.  
Although differences in ownership structures appear to be less important in determining 
investment performance than differences in the legal environments in which corporations operate, 
we did find some differences in performance related to ownership structures that exceeded those 
linked to legal systems.  The difference in estimated qm between the English- and French-origin 
legal systems was 0.43 (1.02-0-59).  The differences between companies with widely dispersed 
shareholdings and other companies in the Scandinavian and Germanic-European countries were 
respectively 0.46 and 0.76.  We hypothesized that this occurred, because companies in countries 
with weak corporate governance institutions will not issue large numbers of shares to outsiders 
unless they can convince them that they will earn attractive returns.  Companies with widely 
dispersed shareholdings in the Scandinavian and Germanic-European countries may also earn 
higher returns on investment, because they have extensive operations in countries like Great 
Britain and the United States and thus are effectively subject to English-origin legal systems.   
Control by the state was also found to have dramatically different effects on investment 
performance between the three Germanic-European and French-origin countries.  State-controlled 
companies in Austria, Germany and Switzerland earned returns on their investment of only 37 
percent of their cost of capital, while state-controlled companies in French-origin countries had 
estimated returns insignificantly different from their costs of capital. 
We also presented considerable evidence that the entrenchment of managers in companies 
worsened their investment performance.  Returns on investment relative to costs of capital for 
U.S. companies fell as management’s shareholdings increased over a range of concentration levels 
running from 22 to 68 percent.  Cross-shareholdings were associated with significantly worse 
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investment performance in both Europe and the Japan 
We have provided considerable evidence that external capital markets can provide 
additional constraints on managers to those created by corporate governance systems.  The more 
explicit contractual relationship between firms and debt holders than between firms and equity 
holders, and the greater scope for debt holders to penalize managers who renege on these 
contracts leads to higher returns on investments made out of new debt than out of either reinvested 
cash flows or new equity issues for companies with qm < 1.  A  hierarchy of finance with respect 
to the returns on investment exists for these companies that differs from that usually postulated in 
the determinants of investment literature, new debt earns the highest returns.  Because of the 
explicit nature of the contractual relationship between firms and debt holders, the returns on debt 
were only modestly higher in countries with strong creditors rights than in countries with weak 
rights.  Strengthening accounting standards, on the other hand, often had a significant impact on 
the returns on cash flows and new equity issues almost regardless of a country’s other legal 
institutions.  The estimated qm for investments out of cash flows was roughly 0.50 higher in the 
full samples of companies in the English- and German-origin countries, and was also significantly 
higher for investments out of new equity issues in these and the French-origin countries.  
One important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is obviously that agency 
problems exist in all countries and can have significant impacts on the investment performance of 
companies.  A second, more comforting conclusion is that agency problems can be mitigated by 
the institutional structures of a country.  Legal institutions that strengthen shareholder rights do 
bring about superior investment performance.  Strengthening external capital market constraints 
can also increase returns on investments out of externally raised finance. 
 27
Appendix A: Balance Sheet and Income Statement Data and Calculation of Variables 
 Data are taken from the 1997 version of the Standard and Poors' Compustat (CS) for USA 
and Canada and from the 1996-2001 versions of the Global Vantage (GV) for all countries. These 
datasets contain balance sheet, income statement, and stock market information. The sample 
period for the data is from 1985 through 2001. We exclude all banks and financial companies 
(SICs 6000 through 6999) and some service industries (SICs above 8100) because the nature of 
capital and investment in these industries is not comparable to those in non-financial companies. 
Table A1 table gives an overview of the sample composition by industry and country group. The 
majority of the sample firms (55 %) are in manufacturing industries, utilities are 11 % of the 
sample firms and 11 % come from the agriculture, construction, or mining sector, and the rest 
from services.  
 
Table A1: Composition of the Sample 
Country group Agriculture Mining Construction Manufacturing Utilities Services 
 (< 1000) (1000-1499) (1500-1999) (2000-3999) (4000-4999) (>5000) 
English 0.80% 8.50% 2.40% 51.20% 10.90% 26.20% 
German 0.30% 0.60% 8.80% 66.20% 8.10% 15.90% 
French 1.60% 2.80% 5.00% 59.20% 12.70% 18.70% 
Scandinavian 0.00% 3.10% 3.80% 60.70% 16.70% 15.70% 
Africa 3.60% 20.00% 0.00% 7.30% 67.30% 1.80% 
Transition 1.10% 8.90% 7.80% 51.40% 22.30% 8.40% 
China 0.80% 1.70% 5.00% 69.40% 19.00% 4.10% 
Total 0.80% 6.60% 3.80% 54.60% 10.70% 23.60% 
 
The variables (CS data item numbers in parentheses) are as follows. The market value is 
defined to be the sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of total debt and 
preferred stock. The market value of common stock is the end-of-fiscal year number of shares 
(54) multiplied by the end-of-fiscal year price per share (199). We use the book value of total debt 
(9+34) instead of its market value. An accurate estimate of the market value of a firm’s 
outstanding debt obligations requires knowledge not only of the associated coupon and maturity 
structure but also of the credit quality of each component. Because such information is not 
available from standard data sources, we use the book values. The preferred stock is taken to be, 
in order and as available, redemption value (56), liquidating value (10), or par value (130). The 
investment of a firm in year t is meant to represent all funds available to the company, which 
could have been paid out directly to shareholders but were instead retained. Thus, investment in 
year t is defined as  
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I = IB + DEP - DIV + Debt∆ + Equity∆ + &R D + ADV 
where IB (18) is income before extraordinary items (profits after taxes and interest), DEP (14) is 
accounting depreciation and DIV (21) is total dividends paid in the fiscal year. These come 
directly from the annual income statements of each company. New debt ( Debt∆ ) is derived by 
taking the change in total debt since the previous period. Net new equity ( Equity∆ ) is calculated 
as sales (108) less purchases (214) of common and preferred stock. Where these items are not 
available, Equity∆  is approximated by the change in the number of common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the average share price ((197+198)/2). 
 &R D  expenditures (46) are reported on CS and GV databases for many companies. 
Missing values are interpolated from surrounding values on the premise that &R D  to sales ratios 
are fairly constant over short periods of time, or approximated using &R D  data at the 3-digit 
SIC code level from the FTC's Annual Line of Business Reports. 
 Advertising expenses (45) are not reported on GV database. For all countries (except for 
USA and Canada) these are proxied using aggregate advertising-to-sales ratios at the 4-digit SIC 
code level from a recent study by Rogers and Tokle (1993) who use firm level data from Leading 
National Advertisers to compute 4-digit advertising sales ratios. The remaining advertising figures 
are approximated by multiplying the actual company sales by 2-digit advertising to sales ratios 
that come from the 1990 IRS Reports on Corporation Returns (Table 6-Balance Sheets, Income 
Statements, Tax, and Selected Other Items, by Major Industry). 
 All variables are deflated using the CPI (1995=1.00). The main data source for the CPI is 
the latest version of the International Financial Statistics maintained by the Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research (WIFO). 
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Appendix B: Ownership and Control: Sources and Concepts 
1. United States of America 
The percentage of insider ownership for US firms is provided by the Compact Disclosure 
(CD) database. The sole source of ownership data used by CD is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s corporate proxy statement. Insider ownership is defined as the total number of 
shares held in aggregate by all officers and directors. We obtain the percentage of total shares held 
by insiders by dividing this total by the number of shares outstanding. This comprehensive 
measure of insider ownership has several advantages over alternative measures as for example 
inferring insider ownership by aggregating individual holdings. First, it incorporates ownership 
stakes of officers and directors whose individual stakes are smaller than 5% of the outstanding 
shares. Second, it alleviates the need to trace each beneficial owner’s association with the firm. 
See Anderson and Lee (1997) for a comparison of different ownership sources and measures. 
Finally, we were able to compile an unbalanced panel for 3,005 firms in total over the years 1988 
– 1997. The median number of annual observations per firm is seven (mean 6.2; max 10). The 
mean (median) value of total insider holdings over all firms and years is 21.06 % (14.22%). For a 
breakdown over time, see Table A2. 
Percentage holdings of shareholders that have significant power to exercise influence over 
corporate affairs or decisions for the USA are obtained from item 12 of form 10-K. 
 
Table A2. Insider ownership in the USA 
Year Mean S.D. Median 
1988 19.23 20.35 12.32 
1989 21.78 20.93 15.23 
1990 21.72 20.91 15.72 
1991 21.21 20.90 14.13 
1992 21.05 20.38 14.58 
1993 20.22 19.76 13.97 
1994 21.20 20.35 14.59 
1995 21.69 20.76 14.86 
1996 21.55 21.10 14.00 
1997 18.10 19.61 11.48 
    
All 21.06 20.59 14.22 
 
2. Europe 
2.1 Germany 
The data on the ownership structure of the German sample firms have been gathered from 
the 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997 editions of the Wer gehört zu wem, a publication of the German 
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Commerzbank that offers information on the identities and percentage shareholdings of firm 
owners. Since this source of data is available every fourth year, we use the most recent ownership 
data for missing years, e.g., the 1995 data are taken from the 1994 edition and the 1996 data from 
the 1997 edition. We cover 359 German firms. This procedure is unlikely to introduce much error 
since the ownership structure of German companies has been very stable. 
2.2. Europe other than Germany 
The ownership data on all other European countries come from the December 1999 
version of AMADEUS. AMADEUS is a Pan-European financial database, containing balance sheet 
and ownership information on over 220,000 major public and private companies in all sectors in 
26 European countries.28 To be included in AMADEUS companies must comply with at least one 
of the following criteria: (i) their turnover must be greater than 10 million Euro, (ii) the number of 
their employees must be greater than 150; and (iii) their total assets must be greater than 10 
million Euro. The sources of the ownership information are mostly the annual company reports. 
Information provided includes the percentage holdings of shareholders holding more than 5% (for 
the UK the cut off point is the 1% level), the name of the owner, and the date of the filing. In total 
we categorized 330,941 owners to one of the following owner identities: families/individuals, 
non-financial firm, financial firm, foreign firm, the state, and dispersed owners, defined as owners 
holding less than 5% of the equity. In addition, we were able to rebuild the company pyramids, 
since AMADEUS assigns a company key to all owners in the database, provided these are also 
among the 220,000 companies fulfilling the criteria above. Thus, we are confident that we capture 
the most important aspects of the ownership and control structure, like the share concentration and 
identity of the most important direct owners, the pyramidal structure, the deviation from one-
share-one-vote due to pyramiding, and cross-shareholdings (see below for a detailed explanation 
of these concepts.) We could match 2,890 firms with complete information on the ownership and 
control structure to our CS/GV databases. 
We supplement AMADEUS data for Italy by information provided by CONSOB 
(Document published by the CONSOB as per art. 1/5 of Law 216/74,1998) and we make use of 
the annual reports obtained from www.huginonline.com for the missing data on Scandinavian 
companies. 
Salient features of many corporate governance systems involve pyramiding, cross-
shareholdings, and large controlling stakes of families, financial and industrial firms, and the 
state. Pyramiding potentially induces a wedge between cash flow and voting rights. Suppose, for 
example an ultimate shareholder (X) owns α  fraction of the shares of corporation A, which owns 
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β  fraction of another corporation B, which in turn owns γ  fraction of corporation C. Provided 
that X has "control" at each layer of the pyramid, one way to measure her voting rights in C is to 
use the last direct stake in the pyramidal chain. The fraction of her cash flow rights is only 
α β γ⋅ ⋅ . With for example 1 2α β γ= = = , X has the majority control of corporation C, whereas 
the cash flow rights amount just to 12.5 percent. The cash flow rights to voting rights ratio, CRVR 
is equal to 0.25 (=12.5%/50%) and we code VR=0. The number of pyramidal layers above C is 
three, that is X controls C via two other corporate vehicles A and B, and we code PYRM=1. 
To explain our concept of cross-shareholdings, suppose now that corporation A owns α  
fraction of corporation B, which in turn owns β  fraction of A, where , 25%α β ≥ .  Either A or B 
or both control C, our sample firm. Then we would say that C is ultimately controlled via a cross-
shareholding construction, i.e. CROSS = 1. 
Table A3 presents summary statistics on pyramiding and the CRVR ratio. On average, our 
sample firms operate at the 2.11th  layer of corporate pyramids. Nearly 30% of the firms are in the 
third or lower down layers. The mean ratio of cash flow to voting rights is 0.84. Perhaps as 
expected, the least deviation of this ratio is found for the UK (0.97). On average, around 30% of 
firms have no deviation of cash flow from voting rights. 
Table A3. Europe: Pyramiding and the deviation of cash flow from voting rights 
Country Pyramidal Percentage of firms Mean  Percentage of firms 
  Layers lower than 2 CRVR CRVR=1 
Austria 2.03 20.0% 0.928 40.4% 
Belgium 2.68 42.1% 0.659 25.0% 
Finland 1.98 10.0% 0.881 33.8% 
France 2.13 22.8% 0.748 31.2% 
Germany 2.13 36.1% 0.763 21.6% 
Greece 2.47 29.4% 0.868 66.7% 
Ireland 2.10 14.3% 0.833 18.4% 
Italy 2.00 10.3% 0.888 13.2% 
Luxembourg 3.00 33.3% 0.957 20.0% 
Netherlands 2.29 22.1% 0.844 37.9% 
Norway 2.63 40.0% 0.779 27.4% 
Portugal 2.38 28.6% 0.729 33.3% 
Spain 2.36 28.0% 0.757 36.6% 
Sweden 2.10 27.4% 0.701 30.3% 
Switzerland 1.99 20.5% 0.842 31.7% 
United Kingdom 1.94 8.4% 0.968 29.8% 
     
All 2.11 27.8% 0.839 29.1% 
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3. Japan and East Asian Countries 
Our ownership data for Japan are collected from the 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995, and 1997 
issues of the Japan Company Handbook which lists the identities and percentage holdings of 
the10 largest shareholders and the names of the chairman and the president of the company. The 
information on business group membership is gathered from the 1990/91, 1992/93, 1995/96, 
1996/97 issues of Industrial Groupings in Japan. This source rates the degree of inclination of 
companies to eight of the major business groups in Japan (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, 
DKB, Sanwa Tokai and IBJ Groups). The degree of inclination is rated on a scale of four, four 
indicating the strongest degree and depends on the total group's shareholding among the ten 
largest owners. It also considers the sources and amounts of bank loans, the number of directors 
sent from the group and other characteristics including the historical background of the 
group/company relationship. We consider companies with a strong inclination (rating 3 and 4) as 
group members. Our results are robust to a broader definition (including those rated with 1 and 2) 
or to Nakatani's (1984) refinement of this list, which selects firms in the largest six groups and 
eliminates firms switching groups. 
4. Rest of the world 
We use the 1991, 1994, 1995/96, 1997 issues of the Asian Company Handbook to 
determine the ownership structure of the East Asian countries in the sample (China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand). Similar 
to the Japan Company Handbook these publications list the identity and percentage shareholdings 
of the major owners of the companies in these countries along with the names of the important 
executives (president and chairman), which enables us to designate the shareholders as insiders. 
For some of the missing information on Indian companies, we use the corporate filings at the 
Mumbai Stock Exchange. 
For Canada, we use the FP Survey of Industrials, which gives the identities, and 
percentage shareholdings of the major owners. 
For the ownership structure of companies from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, 
we consult the 1995/96 edition of the Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela Company 
Handbooks published by the I M F Editora Ltda. RJ, Brazil. This publication lists the major 
shareholders, their percentage shareholdings and the names of the major executives of Latin 
American companies. Several issues from 1997 and 1998 issues of AmericaEconomia, are used to 
cover companies not listed in the above publication. 
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For companies from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, we use the 1995/1996 edition 
of Major Companies of the Fareast & Australasia from Graham & Whiteside. 
Ownership structure of Turkish companies is determined by using the 1995 and 1997 
editions of the Yearbook of Companies from the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
We use the information on the ownership and control structure of firms to categorize firms 
into one of the following categories: family-controlled, financial firm-controlled, non-financial 
firm-controlled, state-controlled and dispersed. The criterion of categorization is that the largest 
shareholder of the firm is a family, financial firm, non-financial firm or the state and that her stake 
is larger than 10% of total equity. We define a firm to be in dispersed ownership if the largest 
shareholder of the firm holds less than 10% of total equity. We also categorize group member 
companies as non-financial firm-controlled even if the largest shareholder is not a non-financial 
firm. We repeat all our regressions using the 20% criterion for categorization, however the results 
are virtually unchanged.  It should be noted that the percentage of firms categorized as dispersed 
in English-origin countries increases to 46.3% when we employ a 20% cut-off. The low 
percentage of firms categorized as dispersed in the US is due to the inclusion of many small 
companies. 
Table A4 presents percentages of firms broken down into the five control categories (using 
the10% cut-off) as well as countries and legal systems. We also report the rating on Accounting 
Standards (AS) and Creditor Rights (CR). The entries for each legal system report the medians of 
AS and CR ratings and the means of our control dummies. 
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Table A4: Sample Composition by Ownership Category, Country, and Legal System 
 Accounting Creditor Number of Control 
Country Standards Rights Firms Family Financial Non-financial State Dispersed 
Australia 75 1 114 30.7% 17.5% 30.7% 0.0% 21.1%
Bermuda na na 12 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Canada 74 1 280 34.6% 19.6% 40.4% 3.3% 2.1%
Cayman Islands na na 5 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Great Britain 78 4 687 17.9% 37.0% 15.1% 1.8% 28.2%
Hong Kong 69 4 43 14.0% 34.9% 51.2% 0.0% 0.0%
India 57 4 37 2.7% 2.7% 43.2% 51.4% 0.0%
Ireland na 1 24 29.2% 20.8% 16.7% 8.3% 25.0%
Israel 64 4 14 28.6% 14.3% 50.0% 0.0% 7.1%
Malaysia 76 4 158 38.0% 10.1% 48.1% 1.9% 1.9%
New Zealand 70 3 18 0.0% 55.6% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Pakistan na 4 1 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Singapore 78 4 97 27.8% 28.9% 43.3% 0.0% 0.0%
South Africa 70 3 25 24.0% 24.0% 48.0% 4.0% 0.0%
Thailand 64 3 81 7.4% 56.8% 32.1% 3.7% 0.0%
USA 71 1 3,070 47.3% 25.9% 14.6% 0.9% 11.3%
     
English 71 3.5 4,666 39.2% 26.9% 19.8% 1.7% 12.4%
    
Denmark 62 3 40 25.0% 12.5% 25.0% 2.5% 35.0%
Finland 77 1 34 5.9% 17.6% 38.2% 23.6% 14.7%
Norway 74 2 42 16.7% 23.8% 47.6% 7.1% 4.8%
Sweden 83 2 54 16.7% 38.9% 33.3% 3.7% 7.4%
    
Scandinavian 64 2 170 16.5% 24.7% 35.9% 8.2% 14.7%
    
Austria 54 3 30 6.7% 23.3% 53.3% 16.7% 0.0%
Germany 62 3 240 26.7% 15.4% 48.8% 7.0% 2.1%
Japan 65 2 1,036 5.9% 6.6% 58.1% 0.2% 29.2%
South Korea 62 3 16 25.0% 6.3% 25.0% 12.4% 31.3%
Switzerland 68 1 66 33.3% 10.6% 42.4% 4.6% 9.1%
Taiwan 65 2 11 18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 54.5%
     
German 63.5 2.5 1,399 11.1% 8.6% 54.9% 2.2% 23.2%
    
Argentina 45 1 8 12.5% 25.0% 50.0% 12.5% 0.0%
Belgium 61 2 41 9.8% 34.1% 53.7% 0.0% 2.4%
Brazil 54 1 25 12.0% 12.0% 56.0% 20.0% 0.0%
Chile 52 2 9 11.1% 44.4% 33.3% 0.1% 11.1%
France 69 0 187 25.1% 17.6% 51.3% 2.3% 3.7%
Greece 55 1 5 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0% 0.0%
Indonesia na 4 41 34.1% 9.8% 48.8% 7.3% 0.0%
Italy 62 2 57 3.5% 40.4% 47.4% 3.4% 5.3%
Luxembourg na na 3 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0%
Mexico 60 0 8 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 64 2 66 6.1% 13.6% 43.9% 6.1% 30.3%
Netherlands  Antilles na na 5 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Panama na na 3 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.1% 0.0%
Peru 38 0 1 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Philippines 65 0 4 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Portugal 36 1 10 0.0% 20.0% 30.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Spain 64 2 59 1.7% 23.7% 57.6% 8.5% 8.5%
Turkey 51 2 5 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Venezuela 40 na 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
    
French 54.5 1 538 15.8% 21.0% 50.2% 6.1% 6.9%
    
China na na 2 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
    
Total 64 2 6,775 30.9% 22.6% 29.9% 2.3% 14.3%
 
 
 
 35
References 
Anderson, R. C. and D. S. Lee. 1997. "Field Guide for Research Using Ownership Data," Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Supplement to Vol. 32, 1-13. 
Backman, Michael. 1999. Asian Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia, Singapore: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Baumol, W. J. 1959. Business Behavior, Value and Growth. New York: Macmillan. 
Baumol, W. J., P. Heim, B.G. Malkiel, and R.E. Quandt. 1970. "Earnings Retention, New Capital and the 
Growth of the Firm," Review of Economics and Statistics 52: 345-355. 
Bavishi, V. B. (Ed.) 1993. International Accounting and Auditing Standards, Princeton, N.J.: CIFAR. 
Berle, Adolf A. and Gardener C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P.Lang. 2000. "The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112. 
Cosh, Andrew D., Paul M. Guest, and Alan Hughes. 2000. "Managerial Discretion and Takeover 
Performance", WP ESRC Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University. 
Doidge, C., G.A. Karolyi and R. Stulz. 2001. "Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More," 
NBER WP 8538. 
Duesenberry, J.S. 1958. Business Cycles and Economic Growth, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Economist, 1998. "Why Did Asia Crash," Jan 10th. 
Edwards, J. S. S. and K. Fischer. 1994. Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, Cambridge University 
Press.  
Faccio, Mara, Larry H.P. Lang and Leslie Young. 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American 
Economic Review 91(1): 54-78. 
Fazzari, S.M. , Hubbard R. G. and Petersen B. 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment",  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 141-195. 
Grabowski, H. and D. C. Mueller. 1972. "Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm 
Expenditures," Review of Economics and Statistics 54: 9-24. 
Grabowski, H. and D. C. Mueller. 1975. "Life-Cycle Effects on Corporate Returns on Retentions," Review 
of Economics and Statistics 57: 400-409. 
Gugler, Klaus.(Ed.) 2001. Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University Press. 
 36
Gugler, Klaus and B. Burcin Yurtoglu. 2001. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in 
Germany," WP University of Vienna, (http://godel.upf.es/papers/paper_27.pdf). 
Hoshi, Takeo, A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: 
Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups", Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 33-60. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 1997. "Legal Determinants of External 
Finance," Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of 
Political Economy 106: 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend 
Policies Around the World," Journal of Finance 55: 1-33. 
Levine, R. and S. Zervos. 1998. "Stock Markets, Banks and Economic Growth, " American Economic 
Review 88: 537-558. 
Lewellen, W.G. and S.G. Badrinath. 1997. "On the Measurement of Tobin’s q," Journal of Financial 
Economics 44, 77-122. 
Marris, Robin.1964. The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, London. 
Marris, Robin. 1998. Managerial Capitalism in Retrospect, Macmillan, London. 
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. 1958. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of 
Investment,” American Economic Review 48: 261-97. 
Morck, R., Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1988. "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis," Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315. 
Mueller, Dennis C., and Elizabeth Reardon. 1993. "Rates of Return on Corporate Investment," Southern 
Economic Journal 60: 430-53. 
Mueller, Dennis C. and B. Burcin Yurtoglu. 2000. "Country Legal Environments and Corporate 
Investment Performance," German Economic Review 1:187-220. 
Myers, S. C. and N. Majluf . 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information that Investors Do Not," Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221. 
Nakatani, Iwao. 1984. "The Economic Role of Financial Corporate Grouping," in M. Aoki, ed., The 
Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm (Amsterdam: North Holland). 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales. 1998. "Financial Dependence and Growth, American Economic Review 88: 559-
586. 
Rogers, R. T. and R. J. Tokle. 1993. Advertising Expenditures in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: 1967 and 
1982, WP No. 34, Northeast Regional Research Project 165. 
 37
Schiantarelli, F. and A. Sembenelli. 2000. "Form of Ownership and Financial Constraints: Panel Data 
Evidence From Flow of Funds and Investment Equations, " Empirica 27: 175-192. 
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1911. Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, (The 
Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1934). 
Shiller, R.J. 1981."Do Stock Prices Move too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Movements in 
Dividends?" American Economic Review 71 (3): 421-36. 
Shiller, R.J. 2000. Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press. 
Shin, H.H. and Y.S. Park.1999. "Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from 
Korean 'chaebols', " Journal of Corporate Finance 5: 169-191. 
Shinnar, Reuel, Dressler, Ofer, Feng, C. A., and Alan L. Avidan. 1989. "Estimation of the Economic Rates 
of Return for Industrial Companies," Journal of Business 62: 417-445. 
Stiglitz, J. and Andrew Weiss.1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American 
Economic Review, 71: 393-410. 
White, H., 1980, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
 
 39
Table 1     Summary Statistics and Sample Composition by Country, 1985- 2000 
1 1( )t ttM M M− −−  1ttInvestment M −  1ttCF M −  1ttDebt M −∆  1ttEquity M −∆  Country Sample Period 
Number 
of Firms 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Australia 1985-2000 346 0.127 0.512 0.150 0.250 0.041 0.134 0.014 0.146 0.060 0.154 
Bermuda 1985-2000 215 0.079 0.532 0.163 0.277 0.055 0.156 0.003 0.169 0.039 0.109 
Canada 1985-2000 1478 0.174 0.516 0.175 0.246 0.062 0.112 0.031 0.165 0.055 0.133 
Cayman Islands 1985-2000 42 0.151 0.604 0.149 0.238 0.045 0.153 0.018 0.208 0.050 0.129 
Great Britain 1985-2000 1331 0.101 0.406 0.172 0.231 0.062 0.084 0.015 0.118 0.049 0.160 
HongKong 1985-2000 127 0.089 0.450 0.143 0.237 0.047 0.105 0.018 0.156 0.047 0.133 
India 1988-2000 246 0.064 0.444 0.151 0.208 0.056 0.058 0.002 0.104 0.040 0.125 
Ireland 1985-2000 63 0.208 0.561 0.216 0.297 0.063 0.089 0.041 0.181 0.058 0.150 
Israel 1985-1999 56 0.295 0.644 0.211 0.260 0.056 0.096 0.048 0.195 0.036 0.108 
Malaysia 1985-2000 381 0.185 0.546 0.135 0.224 0.048 0.083 0.020 0.136 0.031 0.123 
New Zealand 1985-2000 66 0.055 0.362 0.132 0.263 0.064 0.072 0.008 0.182 0.024 0.100 
Pakistan 1993-2000 46 -0.043 0.310 0.236 0.352 0.088 0.123 -0.010 0.171 0.014 0.062 
Singapore 1985-2000 208 0.139 0.527 0.138 0.193 0.056 0.077 0.014 0.130 0.032 0.099 
South Africa 1985-2000 118 0.115 0.529 0.147 0.187 0.094 0.095 0.008 0.092 0.019 0.083 
Thailand 1986-2000 243 0.057 0.472 0.195 0.296 0.072 0.129 0.021 0.165 0.046 0.177 
USA 1985-2000 8591 0.125 0.448 0.146 0.213 0.059 0.098 0.022 0.148 0.017 0.103 
             
English 1985-2000 13557 0.127 0.504 0.154 0.237 0.046 0.122 0.022 0.152 0.035 0.127 
             
Denmark 1985-2000 101 0.054 0.385 0.199 0.226 0.087 0.073 0.006 0.119 0.033 0.145 
Finland 1985-2000 79 0.095 0.408 0.151 0.191 0.089 0.065 -0.004 0.145 0.018 0.073 
Norway 1985-1999 103 0.097 0.442 0.167 0.226 0.073 0.082 0.014 0.155 0.039 0.123 
Sweden 1985-2000 156 0.115 0.410 0.195 0.270 0.080 0.068 0.005 0.143 0.051 0.186 
Scandinavian 1985-2000 439 0.104 0.424 0.183 0.247 0.081 0.076 0.006 0.140 0.038 0.150
Austria 1985-2000 82 0.021 0.367 0.211 0.282 0.105 0.098 0.014 0.159 0.032 0.152 
Germany 1985-2000 425 0.049 0.335 0.235 0.262 0.108 0.114 0.008 0.129 0.024 0.106 
Japan 1985-2000 2219 0.059 0.336 0.111 0.143 0.037 0.046 0.022 0.098 0.016 0.053 
South Korea 1988-1999 82 0.302 0.492 0.289 0.311 0.065 0.161 0.131 0.274 0.029 0.057 
Switzerland 1985-2000 160 0.108 0.374 0.209 0.268 0.101 0.092 0.004 0.140 0.025 0.134 
Taiwan 1988-1999 126 0.067 0.456 0.155 0.193 0.042 0.047 0.026 0.090 0.062 0.150 
             
German 1985-2000 3094 0.066 0.350 0.137 0.188 0.051 0.071 0.021 0.113 0.021 0.079 
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Table 1     (Continued) Summary Statistics and Sample Composition by Country, 1985- 2000 
1 1( )t ttM M M− −−  1ttInvestment M −  1ttCF M −  1ttDebt M −∆  1ttEquity M −∆  Country Sample Period 
Number 
of Firms 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Argentina 1989-2000 24 0.046 0.361 0.257 0.318 0.128 0.188 0.055 0.154 0.030 0.180 
Belgium 1985-2000 79 0.058 0.327 0.233 0.326 0.102 0.076 0.007 0.157 0.017 0.095 
Brazil 1989-2000 133 0.135 0.637 0.125 0.326 0.064 0.208 -0.006 0.102 0.020 0.162 
Chile 1988-1999 73 0.089 0.433 0.161 0.169 0.088 0.074 0.032 0.103 0.027 0.091 
Colombia 1989-1999 15 0.000 0.570 0.131 0.172 0.083 0.121 0.017 0.130 0.006 0.021 
France 1985-2000 495 0.066 0.347 0.222 0.265 0.106 0.097 0.002 0.148 0.029 0.114 
Greece 1988-1999 49 0.535 0.684 0.418 0.448 0.083 0.065 0.034 0.143 0.269 0.422 
Indonesia 1989-1999 132 0.143 0.542 0.194 0.305 0.045 0.135 0.049 0.182 0.054 0.176 
Italy 1985-2000 150 0.058 0.324 0.187 0.256 0.099 0.082 0.004 0.171 0.026 0.104 
Luxembourg 1986-2000 12 0.139 0.464 0.198 0.191 0.106 0.080 0.040 0.132 0.029 0.130 
Mexico 1986-1999 81 0.100 0.448 0.198 0.247 0.099 0.118 0.031 0.145 0.028 0.117 
Netherlands 1985-2000 174 0.095 0.357 0.227 0.235 0.110 0.074 0.017 0.125 0.034 0.146 
Netherlands  Antilles 1985-2000 19 0.142 0.325 0.105 0.086 0.072 0.040 0.005 0.060 0.001 0.037 
Panama 1985-2000 4 0.109 0.363 0.074 0.120 0.052 0.039 0.004 0.118 0.001 0.025 
Peru 1992-2000 20 0.068 0.531 0.278 0.381 0.251 0.311 -0.011 0.121 0.005 0.036 
Philippines 1985-1999 83 0.090 0.555 0.154 0.267 0.063 0.120 0.024 0.232 0.040 0.102 
Portugal 1988-1999 49 0.097 0.421 0.250 0.330 0.098 0.083 0.016 0.168 0.036 0.126 
Spain 1985-1999 117 0.096 0.378 0.212 0.304 0.088 0.090 0.011 0.157 0.066 0.207 
Turkey 1990-1999 29 0.419 0.829 0.434 0.422 0.225 0.215 0.040 0.124 0.135 0.280 
Venezuela 1991-2000 10 -0.123 0.299 0.126 0.158 0.104 0.105 -0.025 0.111 0.026 0.067 
French 1985-2000 1748 0.100 0.428 0.210 0.280 0.093 0.109 0.013 0.150 0.039 0.150 
China 1994-1999 70 0.034 0.498 0.290 0.378 0.128 0.172 0.044 0.224 0.025 0.128 
             
Transition Countries 1994-1999 85 0.030 0.309 0.210 0.241 0.126 0.123 -0.008 0.146 0.013 0.029 
African Countries 1994-1999 17 -0.032 0.285 0.142 0.123 0.115 0.061 -0.002 0.080 0.009 0.018 
All 1985-2000 19010 0.113 0.474 0.156 0.234 0.051 0.113 0.021 0.146 0.33 0.122 
The group of transition countries includes 85 firms from Czech Rep., Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia. The group of African countries includes 17 firms from Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Liberia, and Zambia. 
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Table 2     Separate Estimates of depreciation (δ ) by industry and returns on investment ( mq ) by country 
The table presents the results of estimating eq. 4 by constraining (1) all companies in a country, and (2) all companies in a country group defined by legal system to have the same return on investment relative to the cost 
of capital (qm). In both cases we allow for individual depreciation rates defined by 2- digit SIC. The first (second) equation has an adjusted R2 of 0.23 ( 0. 24). The number of observations is 112,590. All t-values are 
robust to heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). * indicates the significance level of a Wald test that the estimated qm is different from 1.00. 
Industry SIC δˆ−  t-value Country ˆmq  t-value ( ˆmq ≠ 1)* Obs. Firms Country ˆmq  t-value ( ˆmq ≠ 1)* Obs. Firms 
Agriculture, Forestry, Comcl. Fishing 100 -0.0038 -0.34 Australia 0.94 22.01 0.20 2342 346 Austria 0.71 5.82 0.02 461 82
Metal Mining, Oil and Gas Extraction 10-14 0.0484 8.69 Bermuda 0.91 11.08 0.27 821 215 Germany 0.57 16.58 0.00 2740 425
Construction 15-17 0.0121 2.75 Canada 1.16 46.27 0.00 9536 1478 Japan 0.86 32.24 0.00 14874 2219
Food, Kindred Products & Tobacco 20-21 -0.0309 -7.36 Cayman Islands 0.58 3.13 0.02 161 42 South Korea 0.70 9.01 0.00 199 82
Textiles  & Apparel 22-23 -0.0261 -4.77 Great Britain 0.85 33.44 0.00 9402 1331 Switzerland 0.64 7.79 0.00 868 160
Lumber, Wood & Furn. and Fixtures 24-25 -0.0072 -0.92 Hong Kong 0.78 8.92 0.01 660 127 Taiwan 1.26 12.32 0.01 354 126
Paper, Allied Products & Print., Publ. 26-27 -0.0035 -0.79 India 0.80 8.20 0.04 906 246 
Chemicals (Without Pharmac.: 283) 28 -0.1446 -27.96 Ireland 1.10 13.87 0.21 362 63 Argentina 0.78 5.09 0.16 86 24
Pharmaceuticals 283 0.0818 8.35 Israel 1.27 6.29 0.18 179 56 Belgium 0.51 7.65 0.00 467 79
Petroleum Refining and Related Ind. 29 -0.0030 -0.38 Malaysia 0.86 17.98 0.00 1809 381 Brazil 0.25 4.09 0.00 379 133
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 30 -0.0119 -1.65 New Zealand 0.86 12.36 0.05 328 66 Chile 1.24 5.38 0.29 214 73
Leather and Leather Products 31 -0.0397 -2.57 Pakistan 0.40 4.67 0.00 105 46 Colombia 0.43 2.66 0.00 44 15
Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Prd. 32 -0.0134 -2.40 Singapore 0.97 10.31 0.75 1182 208 France 0.57 16.51 0.00 2591 495
Primary Metal Industries 33 -0.0050 -0.97 South Africa 1.07 5.11 0.72 549 118 Greece 0.54 4.50 0.00 113 49
Fabricated Metals 34 -0.0150 -2.52 Thailand 0.64 10.53 0.00 1328 243 Indonesia 0.84 9.50 0.06 516 132
Indrl & Comcl. Machinery, Com. Eq. 35 -0.0069 -1.48 USA 1.05 89.39 0.00 52793 8591 Italy 0.64 13.27 0.00 810 150
El. Machinery, Other Electrical Eq. 36 0.0094 1.89  Luxembourg 0.70 1.50 0.52 56 12
Transportation Equipment 37 -0.0223 -4.35 Denmark 0.65 6.22 0.00 532 101 Mexico 0.50 5.01 0.00 312 81
Measurement Instruments 38 0.0143 2.13 Finland 0.96 9.91 0.69 420 79 Netherlands 0.69 9.83 0.00 1068 174
Misc. Manufacturing 39 -0.0214 -1.95 Norway 1.04 12.64 0.63 511 103 Netherlands  Antilles 1.19 8.54 0.17 88 19
Transportation 47 -0.0125 -2.91 Sweden 0.65 6.01 0.00 657 156 Panama 1.25 6.09 0.23 36 4
Communications 48 0.1033 12.33  Peru 0.11 0.88 0.00 45 20
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 49 0.0068 1.96  Philippines 1.00 5.26 0.98 249 83
Durable Goods-Wholesale 50-59 -0.0007 -0.23  Portugal 0.46 4.43 0.00 180 49
Services 70 0.0144 3.05  Spain 0.54 10.10 0.00 764 117
    Turkey 0.52 3.89 0.00 75 29
Legal System   ˆmq  t-value       Venezuela 0.58 2.79 0.04 32 10 
English Origin  1.02 111.34  
Scandinavian Origin  0.78 13.67  China 0.45 3.96 0.00 121 70
German Origin  0.74 35.51  
French Origin  0.59 29.23  
Transition Countries†  0.64 4.30  
African Countries†   0.77 10.90   
†  The group of transition countries includes 85 firms from Czech Rep., Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia. The group of African countries includes 17 firms 
from Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Zambia. 
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Table 3     The Effects of Ownership on the Returns on Investment ( mq ) by Country Group 
The table presents the results of estimating eq. 4 by allowing qm to take on different values depending on both a company's country of origin and its ownership structure. The first entry for each 
ownership category gives the point estimate of qm for that category. The second entry is the qm for the remaining companies in that country group. The > (<) sign between the two numbers 
indicates that the first entry is greater (smaller) than the second one. The number below the inequality is the level of significance of this difference, the numbers below each entry indicate the p-
value of a test that the estimated coefficient is equal to 1. . Entries in bold face indicate differences significant at the 5 percent level, or better (two tailed test). The number of observations is 
70,252 and the adjusted R2 's are about 0.23. All t- tests are based on White (1980) standard errors. All equations include 24 industry dummies (not reported). 
 
 
 English  Scandinavian European-German  Asian-German French 
  Origin   Origin  Origin   Origin  Origin 
                  
Family 1.082 > 1.019  0.773 > 0.739 0.599 < 0.636  0.987 > 0.872 0.569 < 0.605
 0.00 0.02 0.22  0.12 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00  0.92 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 
                  
Financial 1.002 < 1.061  0.561 < 0.812 0.561 < 0.640  0.869 < 0.882 0.692 > 0.579
 0.92 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00  0.32 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
                  
Non-Financial 1.058 > 1.041  0.718 < 0.761 0.626 < 0.628  0.896 > 0.863 0.565 < 0.644
 0.03 0.59 0.00  0.00 0.73 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.00  0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
                  
Dispersed 1.001 < 1.050  1.145 > 0.683 1.358 > 0.601  0.829 < 0.906 0.543 < 0.605
 0.91 0.21 0.00  0.40 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 
                  
State 1.014 < 1.045  0.796 > 0.743 0.374 < 0.634  1.322 > 0.880 0.952 > 0.588
  0.91 0.82 0.00  0.40 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.37 0.23 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.00 
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Table 4     The Effects of Insider Ownership Concentration on qm in the United States 
The table reports a nonlinear relationship between qm and insider ownership (IO) for US companies. The coefficient 
of IO, IO2 , and IO3 are multiplied with 100, 1002 , and 1003 , respectively. All t-tests are based on White (1980) 
standard errors. All equations include 24 industry dummies (not reported). See table A2 in the Appendix B for 
summary statistics on insider ownership. 
 
 ˆmq  IO IO2 IO3 N Adj. R2 
       
Coefficient 0.95 2.71 -8.23 6.14 31,698 0.25 
t-value 24.91 5.25 4.80 3.99   
             
 
 
 
Table 5     The Effects of Pyramiding, Cross-Shareholdings and Shareholder Voting Rights in Europe 
The table reports the effect of pyramiding (PYRM), cross-shareholdings (CROSS) and deviations of control and 
cash flow rights (VR). The variable PYRM = 1, if a company is two or more levels down in a corporate pyramid, 0 
otherwise; VR = 1, if the control and cash flow rights of the dominant shareholder are equal, 0 otherwise; and 
CROSS = 1, if a company is part of a group of firms with cross-shareholdings,0 otherwise;. We again interact these 
three variables with the investment term on the right-hand-side of eq. 4, and include them along with investment in 
the equation. All t-tests are based on White (1980) standard errors. The equation includes 24 industry dummies (not 
reported). See table A3 in the appendix B for summary statistics on PYRM and VR. 
 
 
 ˆmq  PYRM CROSS VR N Adj. R2 
       
Coefficient 0.68 -0.09 -0.25 0.12 10,993 0.22 
t-value 24.74 -2.03 -2.76 2.50   
             
 
 
Table 6     The Impact of Business Groups on the Returns on Investment in Japan 
The table reports the impact of group membership on the returns on investment in Japan. The information on the 
business group membership is gathered from the 1990/91, 1992/93, 1995/96, 1996/97 issues of Industrial 
Groupings in Japan which rate the degree of inclination of companies to eight of the major business groups in Japan 
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa Tokai and IBJ Groups). We categorize 1047 of the 2219 
Japanese firms as affiliated to groups (47.2%). All t-tests are based on White (1980) standard errors. The equation 
includes 24 industry dummies (not reported). 
  
 
  1985-2000 1985-1995 1996-2000 
    
ˆmq  0.94 1.07 0.59 
t-value 42.27 40.09 15.30 
    
ˆmq  * BG -0.11 -0.15 -0.02 
t-value -3.32 -3.73 -0.43 
    
N 12855 9388 3497 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.20 0.14 
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Table 7     Estimated qm s by Source of Funds 
A. By Legal System 
We use eq. 4 by estimating separate coefficients on investment for each source of finance. The first row in each 
country group gives the estimates for the full sample of companies. The second and third rows present the estimates 
with the sample divided into companies for which (firm-level) ˆ 1mq ≥ , and for which ˆ 1mq <  in each country group. 
The number of observations (Adj. R2 ) is 103,722 (0.25) for the full sample, 54,051 (0.34) and 49,671 (0.18) for the 
ˆ 1mq ≥ and ˆ 1mq <  samples, respectively. The p-value of a Wald test that the estimated coefficient is different from 
1.0 is provided below the estimates.  All equations include 24 industry dummies (not reported). 
 
Legal System Sample No (%) of Firms Median qm 1ttCF M −   1ttDebt M −∆   1ttEquity M −∆
            
  All 11,311 1.09 0.86  1.09  1.37 
      0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
English qm≥1 55 1.74 1.48  1.35  1.99 
      0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
  qm <1 45 0.51 0.36  0.77  0.63 
        0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
  All 350 0.85 1.31  1.08  0.55 
      0.04  0.22  0.00 
            
Scandinavian qm≥1 42 1.56 2.29  1.42  1.37 
      0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
  qm <1 58 0.55 0.71  0.86  0.21 
        0.03  0.00  0.00 
            
  All 2,476 0.84 0.70  0.98  1.09 
      0.00  0.13  0.13 
            
German qm≥1 39 1.45 1.57  1.27  1.59 
      0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
  qm <1 61 0.55 0.47  0.83  0.55 
        0.00  0.00  0.00 
            
  All 1,433 0.78 0.64  1.02  0.52 
      0.00  0.50  0.00 
            
French qm≥1 38 1.67 1.39  1.41  1.10 
      0.00  0.00  0.27 
            
  qm <1 62 0.46 0.46  0.84  0.37 
        0.00  0.00  0.00 
                  
Transition All 78 0.76 0.39  1.25  1.29 
      0.00  0.04  0.34 
            
Africa All 17 0.71 0.45  0.90  1.05 
      0.00  0.32  0.78 
            
China All 48 0.6 0.28  1.14  -0.46 
        0.00   0.29   0.00 
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Table 7     (Continued) Estimated qm s by Source of Funds 
Panel B reports our estimates of the returns on investments out of the three sources of funds for weak and strong accounting standards, (AS). The 
number under the coefficients for the weak-AS countries is the p-value of a Wald test against one. The number under the coefficients for the 
strong AS countries is the p-value of a Wald test that the sum of the coefficients of the weak AS countries and strong AS countries is equal to 
one. The number of observations for the full sample is 103,722. The adj. R2 of the qm≥1 (qm <1) sample is 0.28 (0.14). Panel C repeats the same 
exercise for strong and weak creditor rights (CR). The adj. R2 of the qm≥1 (qm <1) sample is 0.29 (0.15). All t-tests (below the coefficients) are 
based on White (1980) standard errors. All equations include 24 industry dummies (not reported). 
Panel B Panel C 
Legal System Sample AS / CR 
1ttCF M − 1ttDebt M −∆ 1ttEquity M −∆ 1ttCF M − 1ttDebt M −∆  1ttEquity M −∆
 All Weak 0.83* 1.02* 1.07* 1.32* 1.05* 2.06* 
   0.23 0.74 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 All Strong 0.49* 0.02 0.79* 0.02 -0.02 -1.00* 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.20 
 qm≥1 Weak 1.65* 1.49* 1.69* 1.87* 1.31* 2.54* 
English   0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 qm≥1 Strong 0.21 -0.19 0.68* 0.20** 0.03 -0.97* 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 qm <1 Weak 0.37* 0.69* 0.58* 0.65* 0.70* 1.06* 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
 qm <1 Strong 0.28** 0.00 0.33** 0.13** 0.01 -0.48* 
   0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 All Weak 1.28* 1.04* 0.64* 1.40* 0.97* 1.01* 
   0.26 0.73 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.96 
 All Strong 0.11 -0.07 0.37 -0.11 0.07 -0.37 
   0.01 0.72 0.01 0.26 0.73 0.75 
 qm≥1 Weak 1.47** 1.48* 0.69** 2.37* 1.21* 2.19* 
Scandinavian   0.42 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.14 0.00 
 qm≥1 Strong 0.91 -0.26 1.50* -0.91 0.26 -1.50* 
   0.00 0.14 0.00 0.42 0.08 0.00 
 qm <1 Weak 1.23* 0.99* 0.56* 0.72* 0.76* 0.48* 
   0.26 0.91 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 qm <1 Strong -0.51** -0.23*** -0.09 0.50** 0.23*** 0.09 
   0.05 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.91 0.09 
 All Weak 0.59* 0.99* 1.03* 1.09* 0.94* 1.33* 
   0.00 0.80 0.69 0.08 0.04 0.00 
 All Strong 0.50* -0.04 0.30* -0.50* 0.04 -0.30* 
   0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.69 
 qm≥1 Weak 0.81* 1.10* 1.58* 2.01* 1.26* 1.77* 
German   0.14 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 qm≥1 Strong 1.20* 0.17*** 0.19 -1.20* -0.16*** -0.19 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.00 
 qm <1 Weak 0.58* 0.89* 0.66* 0.62* 0.72* 0.72* 
   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 qm <1 Strong 0.04 -0.17* 0.06 -0.04 0.17* -0.06 
   0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 All Weak 0.68* 1.05* 0.65* 0.78* 1.04* 0.78* 
   0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 
 All Strong 0.19*** 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.14 -0.36 
   0.09 0.27 0.01 0.47 0.13 0.02 
 qm≥1 Weak 1.38* 1.48* 0.88* 1.45* 1.41* 1.08* 
French   0.02 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.48 
 qm≥1 Strong 0.18 0.00 0.28 0.59 0.42 -0.78* 
   0.00 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.43 
 qm <1 Weak 0.47* 0.83* 0.52* 0.55* 0.85* 0.54* 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 qm<1 Strong 0.11 0.03 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 -0.18 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 
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Figure 1     Investment consistent with shareholder wealth maximization 
 
The marginal returns on investment (mrr) schedule and the cost of capital (i) are given along the 
vertical axis, investment outlays (I) and cash flow (CF) on the horizontal axis. A company with mrrH 
and internal cash flows CF, maximizes shareholder wealth by investing IH and raising (IH – CF) 
externally.  Its marginal return (mrrH) on investment will be equal to the cost of capital (i), its average 
return on investment, r, will be greater than i making mq = r/i>1. 
 
 
 
 
I, CF
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Notes: 
                                                
1 See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1991). 
2 See Baumol, Heim, Malkiel and Quandt (1970, hereafter BHMQ), Grabowski and Mueller (1975), 
Shinnar, Dressler, Feng and Avidan (1989), and Mueller and Reardon (1993). 
3 See, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2000), Shin and Park (1999). 
4 See, Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000). 
5 Later we shall distinguish among the mq s for investments out of different sources of finance using 
subscripts. 
6 See, Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Grabowski and Mueller (1972, 1975). 
7 For further discussion and evidence see, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2001). 
8 For evidence that dominant owners do exploit minority shareholders in countries with weak corporate 
governance systems, see Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001). 
9 For examples and discussion, see Gugler (2001). 
10 See, Edwards and Fischer (1994). 
11 See, Backman (2001) and Economist (1998). 
12 The methodology is developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). 
13 Although both the market value of the firm, M, and its investment, I, carry a t subscript, equation (4) 
does not suffer from a simultaneous equation bias. tM  is a company’s market value at the end of year t, 
while tI  is the investment flow over year t. Thus, tI  is measured before tM  and can be treated as 
exogenous. 
14 A possible bias in estimating the returns on investment relative to the cost of capital using (4) arises, if 
the market anticipates the investments to be made in the future and the returns on them. Equation (4) 
accurately estimates mq , even if the market correctly anticipates these investments at t -1, if the expected 
returns on future investments equal a company’s cost of capital (r=i). The methodology will yield lower 
(higher) estimates of mq  and δ , if at t -1 the market correctly anticipates investment at t with returns r> 
i (r<i). See Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) for a detailed discussion and evidence that there is no 
systematic bias in our estimates. 
15 See Shiller (1981, 2000). 
16 We have added Bermuda and the Cayman Islands to LLSV’s set of English-origin countries and 
Luxembourg to the French-origin group. 
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17 Consistently, Doidge et al. (2001) find that foreign companies listed in the U.S. have a greater Tobin’s 
q ratio than firms from the same country that are not listed in the U.S.  
18 In the French-origin countries, companies controlled by other non-financial firms have significantly 
lower returns on investment than other ownership groups, when a 10 percent cut-off for significance is 
used. 
19 It is worth noting that the standard error of the estimate of mq  is larger for state-controlled companies 
than for other ownership categories in all five country groups. Thus, the investment performance of state-
controlled companies appears to be much more heterogeneous than for other ownership categories. 
20 A similar nonlinear pattern has been observed between q and insider ownership concentration by Cosh, 
Guest and Hughes (2000). 
21 We use the classification contained in the Industrial Groupings in Japan (1990/91 - 1996/97). See 
Appendix B for details. 
22 Since we control for returns on total investment in Table 7, we do not separate the German-origin 
countries into the three European and three Asian countries. In the German-origin group, most of the 
companies with ˆ 1mq ≥  come from the Asian countries, however, while the preponderance of firms with 
ˆ 1mq <  coming from Europe. 
23 These firm-level ˆmq  are obtained by estimating an equation which includes 24 industry dummies and 
investment-firm dummy interactions. 
24 The index is based on the examination of 1990 annual reports on the inclusion or omission of 90 items. 
These fall into seven categories: general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items. Our breakdown of the countries into the 
two categories is given in the appendix B. 
25 In the French-origin countries, strong accounting standards appear to benefit new equity holders a bit 
more than they do existing holders. 
26 LLSV (1998) use four creditor rights variables in their analysis. These are based on (1) automatic stay 
on assets in the reorganization, (2) whether secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, (3) restrictions for going into 
reorganization, and (4) whether management stays in reorganizations or not. Our breakdown of the 
countries into the two categories is given in Appendix B. 
27 The ˆmq  for the three Asian countries with German-legal-system origins is insignificantly different 
from 1.0, however.  As noted above, the ˆmq  for family-controlled companies in these countries is not 
significantly greater than for other firms. 
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28 The countries are (national information provider in parentheses): Austria (Verband der Vereine 
Creditreform e.V.), Belgium (National Bank of Belgium S.A.) Bulgaria (Creditreform Bulgaria OOD), 
Czech Republic (Albertina Data), Denmark (Kobmanstandens Oplysningsbureau A/S), Eire (CFI Online 
Limited), Estonia (Krediidiinfo AS), Finland (Finska - Suomen Asiakastieto Oy), France (SCRL S. A.), 
Germany (Verband der Vereine Creditreform e.V.), Greece (ICAPHellas S. A.), Hungary (Intercredit 
Budapest Kft.), Iceland (Icecredit S.p.A.), Latvia (KrediidiinfoAS), Luxembourg (Bureau van Dijk S.A.), 
The Netherlands (Delwel Uittgeverij B.V. and NV Databank), Norway (Creditinform AS), Poland (Info 
Credit), Portugal (MOPE Lda), Romania (Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce), Slovak 
Republic (Albertina Data), Spain (Informa S.A.), Sweden (UC AB), Switzerland (D&B Novinform AG), 
United Kingdom (Jordans). 
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